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Abstract 
 
The challenges of energy security and climate change have prompted efforts to 
reduce fuel use and greenhouse gas emissions in light-duty vehicles within the United 
States. Failures in the market for lower rates of fuel consumption necessitate government 
involvement. But efforts have been weakened by a controversial regulatory system, and 
the need for perverse incentives that have contributed to a slight increase in the average 
rate of light-duty vehicle fuel consumption alongside a 70% increase in vehicle travel 
relative to the mid-80’s. 
 
This research evaluates the role of fiscal policies in overcoming barriers to 
reducing fuel use and greenhouse gas emissions in U.S. light-duty vehicles. It conducts a 
survey of fiscal policies and their implementation internationally. A model of the U.S. 
light-duty vehicle fleet is used to assess a fuel tax in comparison to—and in coordination 
with—the recently legislated Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standard 
legislated by the Energy Independence and Security Act. Engineering cost estimates of 
technology improvements and vehicle powertrains are used to evaluate the costs and 
benefits of a technology penetration scenario that approximates the new CAFE standard. 
 
Alongside CAFE, fiscal options can achieve reductions more effectively by: (i) 
acting on a broader range of stakeholders; (ii) influencing behavioral responses as well as 
technological changes; and (iii) by sending price signals across multiple stages of vehicle 
purchase, operation, and retirement. Using illustrative scenarios, the report demonstrates 
that fiscal policies align consumer demand for lower rates of fuel consumption with the 
requirements that CAFE imposes on manufacturers. The costs of reducing fuel 
consumption are estimated to be 8 to 20% of the baseline cost if fuel consumption 
remained unchanged from today, corresponding to retail price increases of $1,500 to 
$4,500 for the average vehicle between 2020 and 2035. These significant costs are 
largely offset by fuel savings benefits within 2 to 4 years relative to no change. 
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1.0 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
In 2005, a reporter for the Chicago Tribune named Paul Salopek arrived at a 
Marathon gas station in South Elgin, Illinois—a small town on the outskirts of Chicago’s 
encroaching suburbs. Here, he met with station owner Michelle Vargo, a single mother 
trying to make a life out of a $2,000 per month income. Despite her stretched budget, 
Vargo is her own best customer: she spends a third of her take-home pay on gas. Between 
11-hour shifts at the station, writes Salopek (2006, p. 9): 
Vargo drives to work in a car she can’t afford. It is 
a white Chevrolet Suburban that churns out a ruinous 10 
miles per gallon and rides so high off the street she has to 
boost herself into the driver’s seat as if jumping into a 
saddle. Her two-hour commute, about 40 miles each way [...] 
is roughly double the national average. 
‘I don’t feel safe in small cars,’ Vargo said 
defensively, refueling one day at the pump. 
 
It’s a fair question whether Michelle Vargo would be better off today if Senator 
Richard Bryan had had his way 15 years earlier. In 1990, Senator Bryan tabled a bill that 
proposed a 40% increase in the number of miles that new cars would get on a gallon of 
gasoline by 2001. The bill would have achieved this by raising Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy, or CAFE standards, a policy lever enacted in 1975 that established fuel 
economy targets for new passenger cars sold in the United States. Non-passenger 
vehicles, termed “light trucks” were later regulated as well. In introducing his bill, 
Senator Bryan’s goal was to sustain a striking trend initiated in the late 70’s and early 
80’s, when the average fuel economy of new passenger cars doubled in ten years. 
But times had changed by 1990. Public interest in fuel economy waned alongside 
declining fuel prices through the late 80’s. At the same time, in response to Bryan’s Bill, 
a strong lobbying effort on the part of automotive manufacturers and labor unions 
organized to stop Congress from mandating further increases to fuel economy standards. 
In the end, these powerful interests prevailed: the bill failed to pass the Senate, and 
passenger car fuel economy standards remained unchanged for the next 17 years. 
The Bryan Bill was a polarizing event that shed light on the political battlefield 
around fuel economy regulations. Environmentalists and politicians supported reductions 
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in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and shifts away from dependence on foreign-sourced 
oil. The New York Times editorialized the Bill as an oasis in a “Sahara of leadership” 
that would “slash America's dependence on foreign oil, trim the trade deficit, roll back 
smog and avert global warming” (New York Times, 1990). On the other side, automotive 
makers and labor unions opposed stringent CAFE requirements, arguing that they 
mandated the production of less-safe vehicle types that consumers didn’t want to buy 
(Hanna, 1990). A majority of consumers—perhaps even a young Michelle Vargo—found 
themselves somewhere in the middle, desiring a mix of safe and reliable vehicles that 
could meet their varied preferences for performance, size, and fuel consumption at a 
reasonable price. 
More fundamentally, the failure of the Bryan Bill highlighted questions about the 
usefulness of CAFE as a way of improving the fuel economy of vehicles: Was it the most 
effective policy measure for achieving the goals of reducing GHG emissions and 
petroleum imports in the U.S.? Why did automakers and labor unions so vehemently 
resist the proposed increases in fuel economy? If fuel economy was so important, why 
did there seem to be an unrelenting demand from consumers like Michelle Vargo for 
bigger, faster, stronger? And, in the face of powerful private opposition and weak public 
interest in the issue, were policymakers at the mercy of concentrated automotive and 
labor interests? 
In 2007, rising fuel prices and concerns over the growth in GHG emissions from 
transportation spurned the first increase in CAFE standards in two decades. But the same 
questions raised back in 1990 persist today. History suggests that aggressive increases in 
CAFE can improve fuel economy in the short-term, but as high prices subside it is 
questionable whether the standards can maintain a strong push for continued 
improvements. Since CAFE was frozen in 1987, the average new vehicle has roughly 
doubled its horsepower and is nearly a third heavier. Rather than channeling efficiency 
improvements into better fuel economy, technology has been used to provide larger, 
higher performance vehicles. If vehicle performance and weight had remained constant at 
1987 levels, fuel economy could have been increased by more than 20 percent in new 
2007 vehicles—up from today’s 25 miles per gallon to more than 30; instead it has stood 
still (Bandivadekar, 2008, pp. 67-69).  
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What’s needed is a second look at how CAFE operates, and consideration of the 
options available to complement and improve its effectiveness. A number of policy 
options exist that may enhance the ability of fuel economy regulations in achieving 
sustained improvements over the long-term. The debate between policy-makers and 
automotive executives has fixated on how high to raise the standards, but unless the 
underlying weaknesses of CAFE are addressed, we may be doomed to repeat the past. 
And if we do, what will Americans like Michelle Vargo be driving 20 years from now? 
1.2 Research question 
The goal of this report is to outline a rationale for the use of coordinated policy 
measures alongside CAFE as a means of reducing fuel use and GHG emissions from 
light-duty vehicles. It seeks to address two primary research questions: 
1. How do different policy measures to reduce fuel use and GHG emissions 
interact with Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards? 
2. Can a set of coordinated measures reduce fuel use and GHG emissions more 
effectively than CAFE alone? 
To approach the first question, policy options available for reducing fuel use and 
GHG emissions from light-duty vehicles in the U.S. are surveyed. Implementation of 
these policies in countries around the world is assessed to determine the extent to which 
measures are being coordinated and the impact that these policies have had on fuel use 
and GHG emissions from light-duty vehicles. Historical trends in vehicle attributes 
including weight, size, horsepower, and acceleration are analyzed to assess how the 
implementation of policies may impact light-duty vehicles. 
To address the second question, policy packages are constructed to illustrate how 
policy measures might be coordinated to complement the role of CAFE in improving 
vehicle fuel consumption. Technology and cost assessments are integrated within a model 
of the U.S. light-duty vehicle fleet to produce illustrative estimates of the cost of reducing 
fuel use and GHG emissions. Policy packages are then illustrated in the vehicle model to 
quantitatively assess how coordinated measures alongside CAFE may achieve reductions 
in fuel use and GHG emissions more effectively. 
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1.3 Report overview 
Chapter 2 outlines the rationale for reducing GHG emissions and fuel use in the 
U.S. light duty vehicle fleet. It establishes the need for government regulation in the 
market for fuel consumption, and identifies challenges that CAFE has faced as a sole 
instrument for saving fuel in light-duty vehicles. The chapter finds that there is need to 
study additional policy interventions alongside CAFE that can improve its effectiveness. 
Chapter 3 briefly discusses the methodology of this report, focusing primarily on 
the details of a U.S. light-duty fleet model developed in the Sloan Automotive Laboratory 
at MIT. The model is used in Chapter 5 to illustrate the impacts of policy instruments. 
Chapter 4 presents a survey of policy measures that could be used to cut GHG 
emissions and fuel use in light duty vehicles. The chapter draws on experience that 
regions and countries around the world have had with these instruments. Where available, 
historical data, results from vehicle technology assessments, and cost estimates are used 
to quantitatively support the analysis of international policy approaches. 
Chapter 5 develops several policy cases to illustrate the behavior of a CAFE 
regulatory mandate relative to a fuel tax policy that increases the cost of private vehicle 
travel. The packages are then coordinated to show the complementary effects from 
reducing vehicle travel while aligning consumer demand with manufacturer’s regulated 
targets. The production costs and changes in vehicle retail price of an aggressive 
reduction target are evaluated, and the role that feebates could play in subsidizing the 
required technology changes is identified. Sensitive parameters in the analysis are varied 
to check for robustness in the modeling approach. 
Chapter 6 concludes by detailing the role that fiscal policy approaches can play 
alongside CAFE. Areas for further study are briefly explored. 
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2.0 The challenge 
This chapter outlines the challenge of reducing fuel use and GHG emissions from 
light-duty vehicles in three parts: first, it explains why these reductions are important; 
second, it establishes the case for government intervention in achieving these reductions; 
and third, it explores the challenges facing government intervention. The purpose of this 
chapter is to outline key areas where the current policy framework faces barriers. Later 
chapters will elaborate on how coordinated policy measures might help to address these 
challenges. 
 
2.1 The need to reduce fuel use and greenhouse gas emissions 
More than any country in the world, Americans are reliant upon the automobile as 
a means of mobility. There are now over 800 light-duty vehicles1 per 1,000 people in the 
U.S. amounting to 240 million cars and light trucks on the road. In 2005, Americans 
drove a total of 2.75 trillion kilometers in cars and light trucks alone—nearly a 25% 
increase from a decade earlier (S. C. Davis & Diegel, 2007, pp. 4-2, 4-3, Tables 4.1 and 
4.2). With increasing rates of vehicle ownership and travel, the demand for fuel has 
grown in near-lockstep: between 1995 and 2005, light-duty vehicle fuel consumption 
increased by 21%,  from 448 to 543 billion liters (EIA, 1998, 2008a). 
The tight relationship between private vehicle travel and energy consumption has 
generated concern for two reasons. First, volatility and imperfections in the global market 
for petroleum impose sudden shocks and elevated oil prices on consumers and industry. 
The economic costs of U.S. dependence upon oil imports between 1970 and 2005 have 
been estimated at 30% of 2006 U.S. gross domestic product (Greene & Ahmad, 2005). 
Light-duty vehicle fuel consumption accounts for roughly 40% of total U.S. petroleum 
use. At the same time, crude oil and refined petroleum imports from other countries 
contribute to 66% of total U.S. petroleum consumption (EIA, 2007; Tables 1.2, 1.3, & 
1.4). Reducing the large share of petroleum consumed by light-duty vehicles will help 
insulate the U.S. from costs imposed by imperfections and volatility in the price of oil. 
                                                 
1
 Light-duty vehicles are comprised of cars, light trucks (including minivans and sport utility vehicles). 
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Second, it is very likely2 that GHG emissions from human sources have 
contributed to most of the increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th 
century (IPCC, 2007; WG I, SPM, p. 10). Warming induced by human-made emissions 
will have impacts in the form of hundreds of millions of people exposed to water stress, 
increased damage from floods and storms, variation in ecosystems and cereal production, 
and increased burdens from malnutrition and diseases (IPCC, 2007; WG II, SPM, p. 16). 
Transportation accounts for one-third of U.S. GHG emissions, of which light-duty 
vehicles comprise 62%, or 1,178 million metric tons of CO2 (322 million metric tons 
carbon) (DeCicco, Fung, & Scrafford, 2007, p. i). Reductions in U.S. GHG emissions on 
the order of 60 to 80% by 2050—if accompanied by commensurate actions from major 
emitters around the world—are believed to be necessary in order to stabilize GHG 
concentrations below dangerous levels. Cost-effective reductions in GHG emissions from 
cars and light trucks will play an important role in meeting these stringent targets. 
 
2.2 Failures in the market for fuel economy 
Reducing fuel use and GHG emissions from light-duty vehicles is necessary, but 
is there a need for government intervention to address this challenge? This is a 
controversial issue. Proponents of government intervention argue that failures in the 
market for fuel economy promote higher rates of vehicle fuel consumption than if the 
market operated efficiently. If these failures do exist, then social welfare can be improved 
when government regulation result in rates of fuel consumption that are closer to the 
efficient level for society. 
Three specific failures are often identified in the market for fuel economy as a 
rationale for government intervention (Portney, Parry, Gruenspecht, & Harrington, 2003). 
First, imperfect competition and price volatility in the global oil market impose economic 
costs that are not taken into account by individual consumers of petroleum imports. 
Second, there are externalities associated with GHG emissions produced in the 
consumption of gasoline and diesel fuel that are not fully accounted for by consumers in 
the U.S.. Finally, there are imperfections in the private vehicle market that cause 
                                                 
2
 Greater than 90% certainty. 
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producers and consumers to undervalue the benefits of improving fuel economy. Each is 
addressed here in turn. 
 
2.2.1 Global oil market failures impose costs on the U.S. economy 
The global oil market does not operate perfectly due to the concentrated market 
power of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). OPEC is able to 
exploit its large share of global oil exports to raise the price of oil above the perfectly 
competitive level. Volatile swings in the price of oil create shocks that can impose 
economic costs on consumers of petroleum products. The National Research Council has 
estimated the costs of oil market imperfections at $5 per barrel of oil, or 12 cents per 
gallon of gasoline (National Research Council, 2002, p. 86). 
 
2.2.2 External costs of fuel use are not accounted for by consumers 
Transportation fuels, such as gasoline, generate GHG emissions that will impose 
costs on society through the impacts of global climate change. These costs are currently 
not reflected in the price of gasoline in the U.S. Estimates of the magnitude of his 
externality vary widely. In a 2002 review of CAFE standards, the NRC assumed a 
external cost of $50 per metric ton of carbon emissions ($14 / ton CO2), which 
corresponds to a fuel tax increase of 12 cents per gallon (National Research Council, 
2002, p. 85). Damages from emissions are expected to rise over time, and efforts to 
quantify the full range of impacts associated with climate change are still subject to large 
uncertainties. 
Other transportation externalities, such as traffic congestion, accidents, and local 
air pollution are estimated to be larger than the costs of GHG emissions. Parry (2005) 
found that these externalities were individually three to six times as large as the external 
costs of GHG emissions (see Table 10 in Section 4.4). These external costs are related to 
vehicle distance traveled, rather than the amount of fuel consumed over a given distance. 
Although regulating the rate of fuel consumption in vehicles is one way of 
reducing the external costs of GHG emissions, incorporating the damages into the price 
of fuel or into the price of vehicle travel is a more cost-effective approach (Austin & 
Dinan, 2005; Kleit, 2004; Parry, 2006).  To the extent that lower fuel consumption 
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promotes increased vehicle travel, the benefits of regulation may be offset to some degree 
by increases in congestion, accidents, and local air pollution as a result of these external 
costs not being accounted for in the price of travel.  
 
2.2.3 Consumers and producers undervalue fuel economy benefits 
Without high fuel prices or increases in CAFE standards, technology 
improvements in light-duty vehicles have been used to provide vehicles that are much 
more powerful and slightly larger in size. Cheah et al. note that if this were to continue 
(2007, p. 8), 
...the average new car in 2035 could potentially boast 320 
horsepower and a 0-to-60 mph acceleration time of 6.2 
seconds, outperforming today’s BMW Z4 Roadster. It is 
questionable whether this level of performance is necessary, 
or even safe for the average driver on regular roads, 
regardless of whether the future consumer truly wants or 
expects this. 
Is the assertion that consumers demand more power than is good for them valid? 
Why would consumers undervalue the benefits of reducing fuel consumption relative to 
improving other vehicle attributes such as performance and size? This is a controversial 
issue within the CAFE debate, but there are at least three clear reasons that suggest 
consumers may value fuel consumption less than the socially optimal level. 
First, the ability of consumers to correctly assess the benefits of lower fuel 
consumption has been hotly debated (Austin & Dinan, 2005, p. 568; Gerard & Lave, 
2003; Kleit, 2004; Nivola & Crandall, 1995). Even so, there is evidence of imperfect 
information failures in the market. Up until recently, fuel economy displayed on vehicles 
deviated by roughly 20% from what the vehicle could actually achieve on-road (Wald, 
2006), and there may still exist a shortfall. Even with a realistic accounting of the fuel 
savings benefit, it may be difficult for consumers to separate the extra cost attributable to 
improved fuel economy across a mix of vehicles with varying attributes (Greene, 1998, p. 
598). 
There is also evidence of a failure of collective action in the fuel economy market. 
While the collective benefits of improved fuel economy are substantial, each single 
consumer has a negligible incentive to consider vehicles with even large improvements in 
fuel economy. Greene estimates that this incentive is as small as $100 for a cars over a 
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range of 30 to 40 miles per gallon (i.e. up to a 2.0 L / 100 km reduction in fuel 
consumption) (Greene, 1998, p. 597). When faced with higher retail prices for vehicles 
with improved rates of fuel consumption, consumers are inclined to select vehicles with 
lower up-front costs over lower operating costs (Gerard & Lave, 2003, p. 12). 
Finally, even those who argue that consumers value fuel consumption efficiently 
agree that consumers implicitly discount future benefits at rates that are higher than the 
societal discount rate (Kleit, 2004). Private consumers are therefore less willing to pay 
for future benefits from reduced fuel consumption (Gerard & Lave, 2003). The impact of 
discounting on fuel savings is shown in Table 1 below. If consumers place a high 
discount rate on the value of future fuel savings, the period of time required for 
technologies to recoup their initial price increase can exceed the average 15-year lifetime 
of a vehicle. 
Table 1: Retail price increase, fuel consumption benefit, and payback period of today’s turbocharged 
gasoline, diesel, and hybrid vehicles. Discount rate (r) is varried from 0% to 20%. Retail price values are 
taken from Section 5.2.1, Table 19;  fuel consumption values taken from Table 20. Assumes fuel price of 
$2.50 per gallon (incl. federal, state and local taxes) and 240,000 km travel over 15 years of vehicle life. 
(ICE = Internal combustion engine; Turbo. Gasoline = Turbo-charged gasoline engine). 
TECHNOLOGY RETAIL PRICE INCREASE BENEFIT PAYBACK PERIOD [years] 
 [$2007] [∆ L/100km] r = 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 
Gasoline ICE $0 Baseline -- -- -- -- -- 
Turbo. Gasoline $700 0.95 2 2 2 3 3 
Diesel $1,700 1.45 3 4 5 6 10 
Hybrid $4,900 2.69 6 8 14 >15 >15 
 
On the supply side, manufacturers may also face inadequate incentives for 
investing in fuel economy improvements. If the benefits of developing new technologies 
spill-over to other competing firms, research and development for fuel economy will be 
under-provided by private automakers (Parry, 2006, p. 7). Additionally, it has been 
suggested that oligopolistic nature of the automotive industry may incentivize risk 
aversion to increasing fuel economy, in that “the biggest manufacturers can observe what 
competitors do and choose to lead, follow, or stand pat, up to a point” (Greene, 1998, p. 
599). 
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Taken together, these three market failures provide a persuasive rationale for 
intervention in the market for fuel consumption. Government intervention offers a clear 
societal benefit of reducing the externalities associated with fuel use. At the same time, 
the value of the improvements in power and size above today’s levels that would be 
forgone by reducing fuel consumption are small relative to the societal benefits, 
depending on the extent to which private consumers undervalue fuel consumption 
benefits. On a broader level, recent volatility in the price of oil and the consensus that 
reductions in GHG emissions are necessary have renewed public interest in reducing 
petroleum consumption in U.S. light-duty vehicles. Given these strong economic, 
political, and societal drivers, further government intervention in the market for fuel 
economy is both important and inevitable in the future. 
 
2.3 Failures in the regulation of fuel economy 
Given that government intervention in the market for fuel consumption is 
warranted, the question becomes: how should the government intervene? In the U.S. 
policy-makers have used Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards (CAFE), which 
mandate reductions in the average fuel consumption of new vehicles. While CAFE has 
been effective in regulating fuel economy, two issues have challenged its effectiveness in 
reducing fuel use and GHG emissions in light-duty vehicles. First, CAFE is not designed 
to address the full range of opportunities outside of vehicle fuel consumption that are 
available for reducing fuel use and GHG emissions. Second, in order to placate the 
concerns of auto manufacturers, policy-makers have had to include concessions that have 
weakened the overall effectiveness of CAFE in improving fuel consumption in a 
sustained fashion (CBO, 2002, pp. 14-15). 
 
2.3.1  CAFE is not able to address the full range of opportunities available 
Bandivadekar (2008, p. 15) notes that fleet fuel use and GHG emissions are a 
function of the efficiency of driving (expressed in liters of fuel consumed per kilometer 
of travel) and the total amount of driving. CAFE is designed to improve the rate of fuel 
consumption in new vehicles, but it does not address ways of improving the efficiency of 
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travel through driver behavior, is it able to influence the amount of vehicle travel 
demanded by consumers. 
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Figure 1: Average fuel cost of travel from 1978 - 20053. Adapted from average on-road light-duty vehicle 
fuel consumption [L / 100 km] and average retail price across all types of motor gasoline [$ / L]. (S. C. 
Davis & Diegel, 2007; fuel consumption and vehicle travel from Tables 4.1, 4.2; motor gasoline price from 
Table 10.4) 
Annual vehicle travel grew by roughly 2.5% per year between 1980 and 2005 (S. 
C. Davis & Diegel, 2007; Tables 4.1, 4.2) as a result of both increasing sales of new 
vehicles, and growth in the number of annual kilometers traveled per driver. 
Additionally, CAFE creates a small incentive for consumers to drive further each year—a 
phenomenon known as the rebound effect. The fuel cost of travel (Pt, in dollars per 
kilometer) is the cost of fuel required to drive a vehicle a certain distance. It is calculated 
from the price of fuel (Pf, in dollars per liter) and the on-road fuel consumption (E, in 
liters per kilometer) of a vehicle (Small & Dender, 2005, p. 2): 
EP  P ft ×=  Fuel cost of travel -- (2.1) 
                                                 
3
 Note that the fuel cost of travel does not account for other variable costs such as oil, tires, and 
maintenance, nor does it include fixed costs such as registration fees or insurance premiums. 
 20
As gasoline prices have remained low over the 1990’s, and CAFE requirements 
have gradually dropped the average fuel consumption of on-road vehicles, the cost of the 
fuel required to drive a vehicle a certain distance has dropped compared to what it was 
twenty years ago (Nivola & Crandall, 1995, pp. 7-8). Over the same time, the annual 
amount of vehicle travel from light-duty vehicles has steadily climbed (Figure 1).  
CAFE is by no means a primary reason for this growth in travel—population and 
income growth, an increased reliance upon private transportation, and lower fuel prices 
have likely had the largest effect (EIA, 2008b). The critical issue however, is that CAFE 
cannot address the growth in vehicle travel that has occurred over the last twenty years, 
even though yet high rates of growth in private vehicle travel have made it more difficult 
to achieve absolute reductions in fuel use and GHG emissions. Alongside CAFE, other 
policies which are able to influence the growth in vehicle travel may have an important 
role to play. 
 
2.3.2 Perverse incentives have lessened CAFE’s effectiveness 
CAFE was created to correct failures in the market for fuel economy, but its 
effectiveness has been limited by the need to address the concerns of concentrated 
political interests, namely auto manufacturers and labor unions. These concerns have 
resulted in provisions that have benefited domestic manufacturers while perversely 
offsetting some of the reductions in fuel use and GHG emissions from light duty 
vehicles4. 
One perverse effect was the distinction created between passenger cars and light 
trucks. Although Congress established fuel economy standards for passenger cars5 in 
1975, it delegated responsibility to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) for setting standards for non-passenger vehicles. In 1978, NHTSA 
implemented a separate light truck class with a lower fuel economy standard. The gap 
that was created between the car and light truck standards generated an incentive for 
automakers to stretch the definition of “light trucks” as broadly as possible in order to 
                                                 
4
 For a detailed discussion of these political failures, see MacKenzie et al. (2005). 
5
 A passenger car is defined as “an automobile…manufactured primarily for transporting not more than 10 
individuals, but does not include an automobile capable of off-highway operation” (49 U.S.C. 
32901(a)(16)). 
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take advantage of the lower fuel economy requirement in this class of vehicles. The 
resulting growth in light truck market share is telling: sales of light trucks increased from 
two out of every ten vehicles to over half of all sales between 1975 and 20056. 
A second well-known provision is the “dual-fuel loophole”. Under the system, 
dual-fuel vehicles that run on different blends of alternative fuels7 with gasoline or diesel 
are rated at a higher fuel economy to reflect their use of non-petroleum substitute fuels. 
The extra fuel economy provided by these vehicles can be credited against a 
manufacturer’s CAFE requirement up to a maximum of 1.2 mpg. Although the stated 
purpose of the policy was to stimulate demand for alternative fuels, a 2002 Department of 
Transportation report found that “the vast majority of dual-fuel vehicles rarely operate on 
alternative fuel”8 (Department of Transportation, 2002, p. xiii). In effect, auto 
manufacturers have recieved substantial fuel economy credits for vehicles that had no 
impact on reducing fuel consumption.  
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 has taken steps to address 
both of these issues. It has prescribed a combined average fuel economy standard across 
both cars and light trucks, removing the incentive to broadly classify vehicles as trucks. It 
has also set a timeline for abolition of the duel-fuel incentive, with a gradual phase-out of 
flexible fuel credits between 2015 and 2020 (EISA, 2007 H.R.6 § 109). 
Despite their perverse effects on petroleum consumption, these provisions have 
served a purpose within the regulatory structure of CAFE. They have effectively softened 
the regulatory blow placed upon auto manufacturers—predominantly U.S. manufacturers, 
who have the highest share of light truck sales out of the twelve largest automobile 
manufacturers in the world and up until 2005 were the only companies using dual-fuel 
credits against their CAFE compliance9 (DeCicco, Fung, & Scrafford, 2007, p. 31). 
                                                 
6
 Auto manufacturers have also exploited the fact that larger light trucks weighing between 8,500 and 
10,000 lbs (3,860 to 4,540 kg) are not subject to the CAFE standards. It is difficult to quantify to what 
extent the market share of these vehicles has grown, as information on their sales and fuel economy of 
these vehicles is not collected by federal agencies. It is assumed that this has also had a perverse effect by 
encouraging manufacturers to sell greater numbers of these heavier vehicles (DeCicco, Fung, & Scrafford, 
2007, p. vi). 
7
 Defined in the bill as methanol, ethanol or natural gas. 
8
 The report states that dual-fuel vehicles were run on gasoline blends of 85% ethanol “somewhat less than 
1%” of the time (Department of Transportation, 2002, p. 40). 
9
 In 2005, Nissan was the first foreign manufacturer to use CAFE credits from sales of its dual-fuel Titan 
pickup (DeCicco, Fung, & Scrafford, 2007, p. 28). 
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Moving forward, policies will need to find some way of addressing the regulatory burden 
placed upon manufacturers. Ideally, policy approaches would align the interests of 
manufacturers with the goals of reducing fuel use and GHG emissions from vehicles, 
rather than providing loopholes that weaken progress towards them. 
 
2.4 Summary and discussion 
This chapter has explored the challenges associated with the need to reduce fuel 
use and GHG emissions, the complex interactions among stakeholders in the system, and 
the failures in the market for reduced fuel consumption and in policy interventions to 
correct these failures. The key findings from this chapter are summarized by Table 2. 
Table 2: Barriers to reducing fuel use and GHG emissions in light-duty vehicles 
POLICY GOAL 
STAKEHOLDER GROUP 
CONSUMERS INDUSTRY POLICY-MAKERS 
Reduce vehicle fuel 
consumption 
Individuals value fuel 
consumption less than 
other vehicle attributes. 
Individual benefits of 
fuel consumption can be 
small relative to up-front 
cost. 
Automakers are hesitant 
to reduce fuel 
consumption without 
clear, consistent demand 
from consumers. 
To support domestic 
manufacturers and win 
support for regulation, 
perverse incentives have 
lessened CAFE’s 
regulatory burden at the 
expense of fuel savings. 
Reduce annual vehicle 
travel 
External costs related to 
the amount of vehicle 
travel, such as 
congestion and 
accidents, are not fully 
accounted for in price of 
vehicle travel. 
CAFE standards impact 
new vehicle fuel 
consumption only; they 
are not meant to address 
the goal of reducing 
vehicle travel. 
Increasing the cost of 
vehicle travel is 
politically unpopular; it 
affects the public 
broadly, and may be 
regressive if revenue is 
not redistributed. 
 
From this review, the following conclusions are drawn: 
• Cost-effective reductions in the fuel use and GHG emissions from light-duty 
vehicles will be important in addressing energy security and global climate 
change concerns. 
• Government intervention in the market for fuel consumption is justified by 
costs imposed by global oil market imperfections, externalities that are not 
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reflected in the price of transportation fuels, and evidence of a collective action 
failure in the market for fuel consumption. 
• Even though government intervention is warranted, CAFE forms an 
incomplete approach to reducing fuel use and GHG emissions from light-duty 
vehicles. 
o Growth in vehicle travel, and externalities that are independent of 
vehicle fuel consumption—such as air pollution, congestion, and 
accidents—are also important issues to address in a comprehensive 
policy approach. 
o In order to win support among stakeholders, CAFE has used 
perverse incentives, rather than aligning the interests of consumers 
and automakers with the goal of reducing fuel use and GHG 
emissions. 
• These challenges provide a strong rationale for examining the role of other 
policy instruments in improving the effectiveness of CAFE in achieving 
long-term, sustained reductions in fuel use and GHG emissions. 
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3.0 Methodology 
This chapter summarizes the methods used to assess the role of policy options in 
reducing fuel use and GHG emissions from light-duty vehicles. Two separate approaches 
were applied: 
1. A qualitative survey of policy options and their real-world application; and 
2. An illustrative analysis of the impact of fuel tax and CAFE policy options 
on new vehicle fuel consumption, annual vehicle travel, fuel use, 
greenhouse gas emissions, and cost using a model of the U.S. light-duty 
vehicle fleet. 
The qualitative survey of policy options is provided in Chapter 4. This chapter 
focuses on the structure of the light-duty vehicle model used to analyze the impact of 
policy options on future fuel use and GHG emissions from cars and light trucks in the 
United States. The methodology used for modeling the affect of a fuel tax policy on light-
duty vehicles is covered in Section 3.2 
3.1 Structure of the light-duty fleet model 
This section provides a brief overview of the light-duty vehicle model used to 
evaluate the policy cases developed in Chapter 5. The model is an Excel-based 
spreadsheet that extrapolates future fuel use and GHG emissions from cars and light 
trucks in the United States based assumed rates of fleet growth and energy use. The 
structure of the model is shown in Figure 2. A detailed description can be found in 
Bandivadekar et al., 2008. 
 
Figure 2: Structure of the light-duty vehicle fleet model. Adapted from Bandivadekar, 2008. 
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The model is calibrated using the Transportation Energy Data Book (TEDB), 
which compiles data from the Federal Highway Administration’s Highway Statistics 
publication. Key assumptions are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: Light-duty vehicle fleet model assumptions (Bandivadekar, 2008) 
ASSUMPTION CARS LIGHT TRUCKS 
New Vehicle Sales   
Sales growth 0.8% per year 
Share of new sales that are light trucks 55% 
Scrappage Rate   
Median lifetime (years) 16.9 15.5 
Growth parameter (β) 0.28 0.22 
Vehicle Kilometers Traveled (VKT)   
Starting VKT for 2000 model year 27,000 km 27,770 km 
Degradation rate 4% 5% 
Annual growth in individual vehicle 
travel 
0.5% (2005 to 2020) 
0.25% (2020 to 2030) 
0.1% (2030 to 2035 
On-road Vehicle Fuel Consumption   
Adjustment factor 22% 
Baseline Fuel Mix (by volume, constant from 2005 to 2035) 
Share of corn ethanol 3% 
Share of cellulosic ethanol 0.2% 
Share of oil from oil sands 3% 
 
The model uses TEDB data for calculating fleet growth, which includes all light-
duty vehicles weighing less than 10,000 lbs (4,540 kg).  It is assumed that light-duty 
vehicle sales grow by 0.8%, and the market share of light trucks is kept constant at 55% 
of new vehicle sales. The survival rate of new vehicles is determined by: 
)
o
t-(t-
e
1
-1Rate Surival β
α +
=  Vehicle survival rate -- (3.1) 
Where t0 is the median lifetime of the vehicle in a given model year; t is the age of 
the vehicle in a given year, β is a growth parameter that describes how quickly vehicles 
retire around the median lifetime, and α is a model parameter set to 1. These assumptions 
are consistent with Bandivadekar, 2008. 
Estimates of vehicle kilometer travel were drawn from historical growth rates 
between 1971 to 2005. Future rates of growth in vehicle travel are assumed to decrease, 
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starting from a rate of 0.5% per year between 2005 to 2020, declining to 0.25% per year 
from 2020 to 2030, and to 0.1% per year from 2030 to 2035. Per-vehicle kilometers 
traveled are calculated from starting values of 27,000 km for cars and 27,770 km for light 
trucks in the 2000 model year. After the first year of travel, annual per-vehicle kilometers 
decrease by 4% per year for cars, and by 5% per year for light trucks. 
Light-duty vehicle fuel consumption is based on EPA fuel consumption data, 
which does not include fuel economy credits for dual-fuel vehicles. Test cycle data is 
converted to on-road fuel consumption using an adjustment factor of 22% to account for 
the shortfall between test results and the actual on-road fuel consumption of vehicles. 
Fuel use is calculated for each vehicle type (gasoline spark-ignition, diesel, turbocharged 
gasoline, hybrid, and plug-in hybrid) by multiplying the fuel consumption by the vehicle 
travel in a given calendar year for vehicles of a given age. Total fuel use across the light-
duty fleet is calculated by summing the fuel use of all ages of vehicles for a given 
calendar year across all vehicle types. 
Table 4: Well-to-wheel (WTW) GHG intensity of transportation fuels (Bandivadekar et al., 2008) 
FUEL WTW GHG INTENSITY 
[g CO2 per MJ] 
Conventional gasoline 92 
Conventional diesel 94 
Gasoline from oil sands 109 
Ethanol from corn 77 
Ethanol from cellulose 9 
Electricity 214 
 
GHG emissions are calculated on a well-to-wheel (WTW) basis, which includes 
upstream emissions produced in the extraction, refining, and transportation of fuels (well-
to-tank) as well as emissions from combustion during vehicle operation (tank-to-wheels). 
Emission factors of various transportation fuels are shown in Table 4. Material cycle 
emissions are also included, which are the emissions generated from producing the 
materials embodied in vehicles. Material cycle energy use and GHG emissions are shown 
in Table 5 for current and future vehicle types. 
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Table 5: Material cycle energy use and GHG emissions for different vehicle types (Bandivadekar et al., 
2008) 
VEHICLE TYPE 
CARS LIGHT TRUCKS 
Energy 
[GJ / vehicle] 
GHG 
[MtCO2e / vehicle] 
Energy 
[GJ / vehicle] 
GHG 
[MtCO2e / vehicle] 
Current Gasoline 96.9 7.7 124.6 10.0 
Current Diesel 95.9 7.7 134.3 10.8 
Current Turbo 99.0 8.0 128.4 10.4 
Current Hybrid 113.6 9.1 144.2 11.6 
2035 Gasoline 114.9 9.3 159.3 12.9 
2035 Diesel 113.7 9.2 159.3 12.8 
2035 Turbo 117.4 9.5 152.2 12.3 
2035 Hybrid 134.7 10.8 171.0 13.8 
2035 Plug-in 137.8 11.1 174.9 14.1 
 
3.2 Fuel tax policy analysis 
This section reviews the methodology used to model the fuel tax policy scenarios 
developed in Section 5.1.2. Two separate responses to increased fuel prices were 
modeled: 
1. The reduction in vehicle travel (km) relative to an increase in the fuel cost 
of travel (in $ / km); and 
2. The increased demand for lower rates of new vehicle fuel consumption (L 
/ 100 km) in response to an increase in the price of fuel (in $ / liter). 
These responses were modeled using estimates of the elasticity of demand for 
vehicle travel and fuel consumption, given by the following: 
t
tt
Pttravel
P
Pd
T
dT
)(P travel of cost fuel in change %
(T) travel vehicle in change %
)(, ==ε  -- (3.2) 
f
ff
PfFC
P
Pd
FC
FCd
)(P price fuel in change 
(FC) nconsumptio fuel in change 
)(
)(
%
%
,
==ε  -- (3.3) 
Where εtravel,Pt is the elasticity of the demand for vehicle travel with respect to 
changes in the fuel cost of travel, and εFC,Pf is the elasticity of the demand for vehicle fuel 
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consumption with respect to changes in the price of fuel. From these relations, the vehicle 
travel and fuel consumption under a change in fuel price can be calculated as follows: 
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Where To and FCo denote starting values of vehicle travel and fuel consumption, 
and Pto and Pfo are starting values for fuel cost of travel and fuel price. These expressions 
define iso-elastic (constant elasticity) demand curves in a given calendar year for vehicle 
travel and fuel consumption relative to changes in the fuel cost of travel and fuel price. 
Knowing the starting values for vehicle travel, fuel consumption and the price of fuel, the 
starting fuel cost of travel can be calculated from equation 2.1. Using equation 3.5, the 
fuel consumption for a given year can be calculated based on the assumed price elasticity 
of fuel consumption and the change in fuel price. With this fuel consumption, the fuel 
cost of travel for a given year can then be calculated. Inserting the fuel cost of travel into 
equation 3.4 yields the amount of vehicle travel in a given calendar year. 
These equations were used to model the changes in new vehicle fuel consumption 
and vehicle travel under the fuel tax policy cases developed in Section 5.1.2. The 
assumed values for each of the elasticity values are discussed in Section 4.4. The 
sensitivity of the results to these elasticity assumptions and starting fuel price is further 
investigated in Section 5.3.  
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4.0 Assessment of policy measures 
Chapter 4 provides a survey of the relevant literature and real-world experience—
both in the U.S. and internationally—of different policy measures that reduce fuel 
consumption in light-duty vehicles. Recent reviews encompassing a broad range of 
options and policy instruments have been conducted by Schafer and Greene (2003), 
Bandivadekar (2006), and Gallagher et al. (2007). Rather than attempt an exhaustive 
review of policy options, this survey focuses on the role of several fiscal policy options: 
differentiated vehicle taxes, feebates, fuel tax increases, pay as you drive systems, and 
scrappage incentives, alongside vehicle standard regulations. 
The goal of this chapter is to provide a qualitative assessment of the features of 
each policy option and its real-world implementation. A summary is provided of the goal, 
the targeted stakeholders, and key advantages and disadvantages of each option. Broader 
conclusions about the suitability of a coordinated set of policy options alongside a CAFE 
regulatory standard are discussed. 
 
4.1 Vehicle standards (fuel consumption standards) 
Vehicle standards are requirements that government entities place on the fuel 
consumption or GHG emissions of manufacturers’ vehicle fleets. The effect of these 
standards is to regulate the fuel consumption of vehicles produced by manufacturers. 
Indirectly, vehicle standards impact consumers by requiring manufacturers to offer 
product mixes and pricing strategies that put a greater emphasis on reduced fuel 
consumption than purchasers might otherwise demand (Kleit, 1990; Nivola & Crandall, 
1995, pp. 28-30). 
The advantage of mandatory vehicle standards is that they can have an immediate 
and binding effect upon vehicle fuel consumption and GHG emissions. Strategies that 
manufacturers adopt to meet these targets will depend upon the magnitude and timeframe 
of the required changes: 
1. When faced with a binding standard over the short term, manufacturers can 
mix-shift, or sell vehicles with a low rate of fuel consumption at a discount 
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while raising the price of high-consuming models. This is an expensive 
approach for reductions in fuel consumption beyond 3 to 5% (Greene, 1991; 
Kleit, 1990). 
2. If manufacturers have enough lead-time to consider the impact of regulation 
in planning their product mix, they can introduce technology improvements 
that allow engines and other components to be downsized, enabling 
reductions in fuel consumption (NRC, 2002, p. 5). Over a shorter time-frame, 
manufacturers may choose to reduce the size or power of existing vehicles in 
favor of achieving lower rates of fuel consumption. 
3. Manufacturers may also simply opt to pay fines to the government in order to 
exceed the regulated standards. In the U.S., several European manufacturers 
of high-performance luxury vehicles have consistently paid fees in place of 
meeting CAFE requirements (NHTSA, 2007). 
4. Finally, if vehicle standards include provisions for banking, borrowing, or 
trading, manufacturers can accumulate credits for use against their target. 
In the U.S., vehicle fuel consumption is regulated by Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy (CAFE) Standards. These standards were enacted in 1975 as part of the Energy 
Policy and Conservation Act, and initially required manufacturers to meet an average fuel 
consumption of no more than 8.55 L / 100 km (or at least 27.5 mpg) in passenger 
automobiles10 by the 1985 model year. The Secretary of Transportation was delegated 
responsibility for establishing standards for the “maximum feasible fuel economy level” 
for non-passenger automobiles, or light trucks. The first light truck standard was 
established in 1979. 
                                                 
10
 The CAFE statute defines “automobile” (encompassing both passenger cars and non-passenger vehicles) 
as “a 4-wheeled vehicle that is propelled by fuel, or by alternative fuel, manufactured primarily for use on 
public streets, roads, and highways (except a vehicle operated only on a rail line), and rated at not more 
than 6,000 pounds gross vehicle weight (GVW)” [U.S.C 49 § 32901 (a) (3)], although the Secretary of 
Transportation was delegated authority to include of automobiles up to 10,000 pounds GVW if feasible and 
warranted. In 1980, this was subsequently extended by the Secretary to include automobiles between 6,000 
and 8,500 pounds GWV (NHTSA, 2006a, p. p. 20). 
 
“Passenger automobile” is defined by the CAFE statute as an automobile that the Secretary decides by 
regulation is manufactured primarily for transporting not more than 10 individuals”, but not including 
automobiles with “a significant feature (except 4-wheel drive) designed for off-highway operation”, and 4-
wheel drive automobiles rated at more than 6,000 gross vehicle weight (GVW) [U.S.C 49 § 32901 (a) 
(16)]. 
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For the past 20 years, CAFE standards have remained unchanged for passenger 
cars. The Secretary delegated responsibility for light truck standards to the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHSTA), which continued to set light truck 
standards until funds for further improvements in the standards were restricted by 
Congress in 1996 (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: New car and light truck fuel consumption and CAFE standards (S. C. Davis & Diegel, 2007, pp. 
4-18, 14-19; EPA, 2007b, pp. 8-9; NHTSA, 2006a, pp. VI-7, 2008, p. 14) 
After the restriction was lifted, NHSTA prescribed light truck standards for model 
years (MY) 2005 to 2007, and a separate rule three years later for MY 2008 to 2011. The 
new MY 2008 to 2011 standards were normalized according to a light truck’s 
“footprint”—the area obtained by multiplying a vehicles’ wheelbase by its track width. 
The footprint method was designed to improve safety by removing the option of 
downsizing vehicles as means of meeting CAFE,  and to prevent manufacturers from 
categorizing large passenger vehicles as small light trucks (NHTSA, 2006a, p. 10). 
On November 16, 2007 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals handed back 
NHTSA’s light truck rulemaking, arguing that it did not go far enough in regulating light 
trucks (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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U.S. Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) increased CAFE standards to a 
combined average of 6.72 L / 100 km (35 mpg) for cars and light trucks in the U.S. by 
2020 (The White House, 2007). The Act effectively supersedes NHTSA’s previous 
rulemaking for MY 2008 to 2011 light trucks. 
In April 2008, NHTSA proposed standards for cars and light trucks from MY 
2011 to 2015 to comply with the EISA. The standards are size-based, measured 
according to vehicle footprint. The estimated fuel consumption levels of the proposed 
rulemaking for cars and light trucks are shown by Figure 3. NHTSA’s proposed standard 
“front-loads” the reductions in fuel consumption needed to meet the 2020 target. Between 
2011 and 2015, the average annual fuel consumption improvement is roughly 3.3%; at 
this rate, the annual improvement between 2015 to 2020 must average 2.1% (NHTSA, 
2008, pp. 11-16). 
The EISA legislation also introduced a credit trading program as part of the 
CAFE regulations. Manufacturers that exceed the fuel economy standard for a given 
model year may earn credits that can be sold to those who fail to meet the requirements, 
provided that all manufacturers comply with a specified minimum standard for cars. 
Automakers may also transfer credits within their own fleets between cars that are made 
domestically, cars made non-domestically, and light trucks. For internal trading, credits 
may be used up to a limit that gradually becomes more lenient from 2011 to 202011. It is 
believed that these measures will grant auto manufacturers more flexibility in 
determining how to achieve CAFE requirements within the mix of products that they 
offer to consumers. 
Internationally, vehicle standards around the world differ from one another in 
their design and implementation. Currently, nine different governmental entities enforce 
vehicle standards (ICCT, 2007).  Figure 4 shows global vehicle standard targets 
normalized to the test drive cycle used to determine fuel consumption levels for CAFE in 
the U.S.12 
                                                 
11
 Credits may be used to achieve no more than one mile per gallon of fuel economy compliance between 
2011 and 2013. This limit is relaxed to 1.5 miles per gallon between 2014 and 2017, and to 2 miles per 
gallon in 2018. 
12
 For details on the procedure used to estimate equivalent CAFE fuel consumption from different drive 
cycles, see ICCT (2007, p. 28, Appendix). 
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California has passed legislation that would require vehicles to reduce CO2-
equivalent emissions by roughly 25% below the combined average for cars and light 
trucks in 2002, or 30% between 2009 to 2016 (California Air Resources Board, 2004; 
California Code of Regulations, 2005). Twelve states planned to adopt these regulations 
alongside California, but in December 2007, the EPA denied a waiver that would have 
allowed enforcement of these requirements; California is appealing the decision (EPA, 
2007a; Office of the Governor. State of California, 2008). 
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1 The standard shown for Canada is an estimate of the changes that will be required in new vehicle fuel 
consumption to meet the government's voluntary standard of a 5.3 megatonne CO2-equivalent reduction in 
light duty vehicle GHG emissions in 2010. 
 
2
 The standard shown for California does not take into account non-fuel consumption related reductions 
that may also be used to meet the state's GHG emission regulation. If other non-fuel consumption 
reductions are pursued, ICCT (2007, p. 24, figure 6) estimates that the fuel consumption of new vehicles 
could be 30% higher, or 9.2 L / 100 km in 2016 and still satisfy the GHG reduction target. 
Figure 4: Global vehicle standards (adapted from ICCT, 2007, pp. 23, 24) 
Outside of the U.S., the European Commission has a voluntary agreement with 
European, Japanese, and Korean auto manufacturers to limit passenger vehicle CO2 
emissions to 140 g CO2 / km (European Commission, 1999, 2000a, 2000b). In December, 
2007 the European Commission proposed legislation that would require passenger cars in 
the European Union to meet a target of 130 g CO2 / km emissions target on average 
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across the new car fleet by 2012. The Commission’s proposal would complement this 
target with an addition reduction of 10 gCO2 / km, to be achieved through “efficiency 
improvements for car components…such as tires and air conditioning systems” 13. The 
130 g CO2 standard by setting targets for individual vehicles based on their weight such 
that the fleet average meets the overall target (European Commission, 2007).  
Japan set vehicle standards in 1999 to achieve a 23% improvement in the fleet 
average fuel economy from 1995 to 2010. By 2004, this goal was reached five years 
ahead of target14 (Energy Conservation Center Japan, 2006, Chapter 2-4). In 2006, the 
Japanese government increased both the stringency of the standard and the drive cycle 
used to test the fuel consumption of vehicles, pledging to achieve an average of 16.8 
kilometers per liter of fuel consumed in new passenger vehicles15 (ICCT, 2007). 
Canada has developed a voluntary agreement with the domestic auto industry to 
reduce GHG emissions from the on-road fleet of light duty vehicles by 5.3 CO2-
equivalent megatonnes by 201016 (Natural Resources Canada, 2005). The Government of 
Canada plans to regulate the fuel consumption of cars and light trucks starting in 2011 
under the Motor Vehicle Fuel Consumption Standards Act. The act was passed in 1982, 
but was not enacted in favor of a voluntary Company Average Fuel Consumption 
program that has closely followed U.S. CAFE standards. In November 2007 the 
Government proclaimed the act into law and is beginning consultations with industry on 
fuel consumption regulations (Transport Canada, 2007b, 2008). 
China, Australia, South Korea, and Taiwan have also established vehicle standard 
programs. China’s standards were enacted in 1995, and a second, more stringent phase 
came into effect in 2008 (Sauer & Wellington, 2004). Australia has established a 
voluntary agreement to reduce average fuel consumption of the passenger vehicle fleet by 
15 percent by 2010. South Korea’s vehicle standards were made mandatory in 2004, 
                                                 
13
 The standard was estimated by ICCT (2007) to be equivalent to 4.8 liters per 100 kilometer (49 miles per 
gallon). The high fraction of diesel vehicles improves the fuel consumption of the European fleet relative to 
its CO2 emissions 
14
 Already in 2004, fuel economy had improved by 22%, essentially achieving the 2010 target five years 
ahead of schedule. 
15
 This standard was estimated by ICCT (2007) to be equivalent to 5.0 L / 100 km (47 mpg) on the U.S. 
CAFE test cycle, or 125 gCO2 / km on the European NEDC test cycle. 
16
 The effect that this voluntary target will have on new vehicle fuel economy cannot be determined 
outright. ICCT (2007) has estimated new light duty vehicles will average 6.9 L / 100 km (34 mpg) on the 
U.S. CAFE test cycle, or 178 gCO2 / km on the European NEDC test cycle by 2010. 
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establishing targets based on the engine displacement of vehicles. Perversely, the 
growing share of vehicles with larger engine displacements is expected to slightly 
increase the average fuel consumption of new passenger vehicles by 2012 (ICCT, 2007, 
p. 20). In 2007, South Korea announced its plans to lower its fuel consumption standard 
by 15% for cars by 2012 (Chosun Ilbo, 2007). 
Based on this review of vehicle standards, the following observations are made: 
• Vehicle standards have an immediate an binding effect on vehicle fuel 
consumption. In response, manufacturers may mix-shift, employ technologies 
that reduce fuel consumption, reduce the size or power of vehicles, pay fines, 
or apply credits against their obligations. These strategies will depend upon the 
magnitude and timeframe of the required changes as well as manufacturer’s 
product mix. 
• Internationally, there is a movement towards more stringent regulation of 
passenger vehicle fuel consumption and GHG emissions rates. The European 
Union, Canada, and South Korea plan to—or already have—enforce 
mandatory standards; while Japan and the U.S. have increased the stringency 
of their existing regulations. 
• Attribute-based standards are increasingly favored as a means of specifying 
fuel consumption regulations. The U.S. has proposed a standard based on 
vehicle footprint, while the E.U. is considering weight-based regulations.  
4.2 Differentiated vehicle taxes 
Vehicle purchase and registration taxes are taxes that are scaled relative to 
specific attributes, such as fuel consumption, horsepower, engine displacement, fuel type, 
or retail price. Differentiated taxes are systems that adjust vehicle tax rates relative to 
attributes that affect emissions, providing consumers with price signals that can alter their 
purchase and vehicle use decisions. 
The advantages of differentiated vehicle taxation systems are that they provide an 
ongoing incentive for manufacturers to reduce the tax burden that consumers may face 
through improvements in fuel consumption. They also stimulate changes in consumer 
purchase decisions and increase the demand for fuel-sipping vehicles. Administratively, 
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differentiated taxation schemes offer a relatively straight-forward and low-cost means of 
providing incentives to reduce fuel consumption. Differentiated tax schemes can also be 
adapted into road pricing or congestion charging systems; in this way, they may serve as 
an “intermediate” step between fuel consumption regulations and pricing systems 
(Sterner, 2003, pp. 234-235). 
Table 6: Basis for registration and annual vehicle taxes in EU member countries (Branden, Knight, Potter, 
Enoch, & Ubbels, 2000; COWI, 2002; Gordon, 2005; IEA & OECD, 2000). 
COUNTRY PURCHASE AND REGISTRATION TAX ANNUAL CIRCULATION TAX 
Austria Retail price, fuel type (gasoline vs. diesel) 
and fuel consumption Horsepower 
Belgium Engine displacement Horsepower 
Denmark Retail price Fuel consumption 
Finland Retail price Weight, vehicle type (gasoline vs. diesel) 
France Horsepower, grams CO2 per kilometer17 Horsepower, age 
Germany N/A Engine displacement, fuel type 
Greece Retail price, engine displacement Engine displacement 
Ireland Retail price, engine displacement Engine displacement 
Italy Horsepower Horsepower 
Netherlands Retail price Fuel type 
Portugal Engine displacement Fuel type, engine displacement, voltage (for 
electric cars), age 
Spain Retail price, engine displacement Horsepower 
Sweden Environmental classes based on rate of 
emissions Weight, fuel type 
Great 
Britain N/A 
Engine displacement volume (pre-2001), 
CO2 per kilometer (post-2001) 
 
The U.S. Gas Guzzler tax is a differentiated vehicle tax levied relative to the rate 
of fuel consumption of passenger cars. Cars that consume fuel at a rate above 10.5 L / 
100 km are taxed relative to their rate of fuel consumption. At 10.5 L / 100 km, the tax is 
$1,000; a car that consumes 19 L / 100 km must pay $7,700 (S. C. Davis & Diegel, 
2007).  
                                                 
17
 France has proposed a feebate system based on the grams of CO2 emitted per kilometer from vehicles. 
See section 4.3 for details. 
 39
European countries currently use a wide range of differentiated vehicle taxation 
policies (Table 6). In an effort to harmonize the diverse tax structure, the European 
Commission has proposed transitioning annual taxes on vehicles, or annual circulation 
taxes (ACTs), toward a tax system based on the amount of CO2 emitted per kilometer of 
travel by vehicles. It has also recommended levying registration taxes to an increasing 
extent on per-kilometer CO2 emissions from cars, and eventually phasing out registration 
taxes across EU member states by the end of 2015 (European Commission, 2005).  
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.40 1.60 1.80 2.00
United States
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britian
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Purchase and registration taxes Annual circulation taxes
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62%
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69%
60%
68%
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1.32
1.50
1.14
1.30
1.51
 
Figure 5: Purchase, registration, and annual circulation taxes on a 1.4 L Volkswagen Golf gasoline car in 
major European countries, relative to the level of taxation on a mid-sized sedan in the United States (U.S. 
data from AAA, 2008, p. 6; European data from Kunert & Kuhfeld, 2006). 
. 
The rates of taxation also very widely across EU member countries. Figure 5 
shows the shares of purchase and registration taxes and annual circulation taxes of 
several European countries for a representative gasoline vehicle18 relative to a mid-size 
sedan in the U.S. These countries fall into the mid-range of taxation rates—some 
countries have much higher or lower levels. For example, Denmark’s registration and 
                                                 
18
 A Volkswagen Golf with a 1.4L engine displacement; assumed an exchange rate of $1.25 U.S. 
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circulation taxes are seven times as high as the U.S., with registration taxes contributing 
to 84% of the overall tax rate. In contrast, Luxembourg’s taxes are the lowest in the EU at 
four-fifths of the U.S. rate. A recent study concluded that this disparate system of 
taxation in the EU reduces transparency in the car market and creates barriers for 
relocating vehicles from one country to another (Kunert & Kuhfeld, 2006). 
As an example of a differentiated taxation system within the EU, the United 
Kingdom currently levies an annual tax based on the per-kilometer CO2 emissions 
produced by vehicles. The tax separates cars by fuel type into seven categories, or 
“bands”, based on the grams of CO2 emitted per kilometer. Cars registered prior to March 
2001 are still assessed based on their engine displacement (European Conference of 
Ministers of Transport., 2007, p. 162). 
Critics have argued that the UK’s CO2-based system duplicates the role of taxes 
on transport fuels, and that reductions in the tax rate for low-emitting vehicles are too 
small to affect consumers’ choices. The government has defended the system as a means 
of ensuring compliance with vehicle safety testing and insurance requirements, for 
discouraging the ownership of multiple vehicles, and for providing funds necessary for 
vehicle licensing and enforcement (politics.co.uk, 2007).  
Differentiated tax schemes can also be adapted into road pricing or congestion 
charging systems. In January 2008, the city of Milan introduced a differentiated 
congestion charge based on the European emissions rating of vehicles (The City of 
Milan, 2008). The city of London has announced that it will vary its congestion charge 
based on the per-kilometer CO2 emissions of vehicles starting in October 200819. 
Outside of Europe, Japan levies a extensive system of taxes on vehicle purchase 
and ownership. Many of these taxes are differentiated by vehicle type, weight, and engine 
displacement. In the past, automotive manufacturers in Japan have lobbied against the 
high rate of vehicle taxation, arguing that the system is complicated and confusing for 
consumers and the distribution of revenues is not clearly communicated in budgetary 
documents (JAMA, 2003; PR Newswire, 2003). 
In 1999, the Japanese government introduced a system of “green automobile 
taxation” which provides a tax reduction for vehicles that currently exceed Japan’s Top 
                                                 
19
 See http://www.tfl.gov.uk/roadusers/congestioncharging/7394.aspx. Accessed April 19, 2008. 
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Runner fuel consumption standard for 2010. To qualify, a vehicle’s exhaust pollutant 
emissions must be 75% lower than Japan’s 2005 regulations. Of these, vehicles with a 
fuel consumption that is 10% below the 2010 standard receive a 25% reduction on the 
annual automobile tax, while vehicles with fuel consumption that is 20% blow below the 
standard pay half of the annual tax. These same vehicles also qualify for lump sum 
reductions in the acquisition tax levied at the time of vehicle purchase (Tabo, Yoshina, 
Sekine, & Saito, 2006, p. 7).  
Table 7: Passenger vehicle-related taxes in Japan (Ministry of the Environment. Government of Japan, 
1999) 
TAX LEVEL DESCRIPTION RATE20 
Automobile 
Acquisition Tax 
Local Point of sale based on price of the vehicle. 
Revenue directed to regional and municipal 
funds for roads. 
5% of vehicle purchase 
price 
Motor Vehicle 
Weight 
(Tonnage) Tax 
National Based on vehicle type and weight at time of 
inspection. Revenue is split 75% / 25% 
between national and municipal road funds. 
New vehicles are 
inspected after 1st three 
yrs., then every two yrs. 
Annual Auto 
Tax and Light 
Vehicle Tax 
Local Annual, based on total engine displacement 
and the type of vehicle. Auto tax revenues go 
to regional governments’ general funds; light 
vehicle tax revenues go to municipalities. 
Rate depends on engine 
displacement and vehicle 
type. 
 
The following observations can be drawn from this survey of countries who have 
implemented differentiated taxation systems: 
• In order to achieve environmental benefits, taxes must provide a sufficient 
incentive for consumers to value vehicles with lower fuel consumption. The 
distribution of revenue generated by differentiated tax schemes should be 
clearly communicated to the public. 
• Differentiated systems should be applied as broadly as possible to increase 
their effectiveness in reducing fuel consumption. The U.S. Gas Guzzler tax has 
had a strong, but limited effect in reducing fuel consumption as it only applies 
to vehicles with rates of fuel consumption higher than 10.5 L / 100 km. 
• Experience in the European Union suggests that a harmonized system of 
differentiated taxes may be more effective than a patchwork of different 
registration and annual circulation charges. 
                                                 
20
 Source: Fuel Taxation Inquiry (2001). 
 42
• Differentiated tax systems appear to be most viable politically when existing 
taxation schemes can be modified to provide exemptions for vehicles with 
lower rates of fuel consumption. Japan, for example, has modified existing 
vehicle taxes to include incentives for less fuel-consumptive technologies. 
 
4.3 Feebates 
Although essentially a type of differentiated vehicle tax, feebates have received a 
great deal of individual attention. Their structure offers unique benefits and challenges 
that warrant separate treatment from other forms of differentiated taxation. This section 
reviews the feebate-specific literature and international implementation of feebate 
systems. 
Feebates are financial incentives that use a sliding-scale to adjust the retail price 
of cars and light trucks. Under a typical feebate system, a rebate is subtracted from the 
price of vehicles that consume fuel at a low rate, while a fee is added to the price of those 
that consume fuel at a high rate. Important features of feebates include: 
• The vehicle attribute from which the feebate incentive is calculated. For 
instance, a feebate’s sliding scale may be based on vehicles’ fuel consumption 
(L / 100 km), fuel economy (mpg), or GHG emissions (grams CO2 / km). 
• The schedule of the feebate, or the rate at which the feebate is applied. A linear 
schedule is the simplest type of feebate, where a flat rate is applied per unit of 
the attribute the feebate acts on (e.g. x dollars per L / 100 km, or y dollars per 
mpg, etc.). Feebate schedules may apply continuously across a full range of 
vehicle offerings, or they may be discretely applied across a limited range. 
Nonlinear feebate schedules have been suggested that increase the rate of fee 
or rebate across the range where most vehicles fall, increasing the impact of the 
policy without placing large feebates on the few vehicles with low or high rates 
of fuel consumption. Size-based schedules have also been suggested that would 
normalize feebates to some measure of vehicle size, such as interior volume or 
footprint. 
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• The pivot or zero point of the feebate. This is the point where the feebate is 
zero; vehicles which do better than this point receive a rebate—vehicles that do 
worse than this point are levied a fee. Instead of a point, the pivot may be a 
band, or range of values across which the feebate is set to zero. An interesting 
characteristic of feebates is revenue neutrality—their ability to be designed 
such that the revenue generated from the collection of fees is cancelled by the 
rebates paid out. If revenue neutrality is desired, it is necessary to continually 
adjust the zero point downward as the fuel consumption of vehicles improves 
under a feebate system. 
• The point of application of the feebate. This determines whether the feebate is 
applied directly upon manufacturers based on their sales mix for a given model 
year, or whether it is applied to consumers at the time when they purchase 
vehicles. Nearly all feebate systems are applied to consumers, since it is 
generally assumed that manufacturers will react to feebate incentives 
regardless of whether they are applied upon them directly or not, while 
consumers will only react to feebates if they are applied at the point of 
purchase. 
Feebates induce a two separate responses from consumers who purchase vehicles, 
and from auto manufacturers that supply vehicles. From consumers, the elicit a demand 
response. When fees and rebates are applied to the price of vehicles at the time of 
purchase, these prices changes are visible to consumers, who shift their purchases 
towards vehicles with attributes that favor smaller fees or larger rebates (i.e. lower rates 
of fuel consumption or GHG emissions). Feebates also generate a supply response from 
manufacturers. Vehicle producers can apply technologies that reduce the rate of fuel 
consumption in order to lower the fee or increase the rebate assessed on a given vehicle. 
Feebates share many advantages with differentiated vehicle tax systems. They 
tend to be progressive, since lower-income groups are more likely to purchase smaller 
vehicles with lower rates of fuel consumption that are made cheaper under the incentive 
(HLB Decision Economics Inc., 1999, p. 10). As a fiscal incentive, feebates can work 
alongside CAFE to hasten the penetration of technologies that reduce fuel use and GHG 
emissions in the fleet. Accounting for the value of energy consumption over a vehicles’ 
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lifetime in a lump sum at the time of vehicle purchase, feebates send a price signal to 
consumers who may value fuel savings over a short pay-back period (Greene, Patterson, 
Singh, & Li, 2005, p. 761). Feebates can also be combined with road use charges and fuel 
tax charges to send reinforcing price signals to consumers  (Levenson & Gordon, 1990, 
pp. 413, 414). 
It is argued that feebates may be easier to implement than fuel tax increases since 
they charge only those who elect to purchase vehicles that consume fuel faster, rather 
than a fuel tax that is applied broadly across the public. Finally, feebates provide a 
“continuing incentive” to direct new technologies towards achieving lower fuel 
consumption (Greene, Patterson, Singh, & Li, 2005, p. 758). 
Feebate proposals may face barriers due to their disproportionate impacts across 
manufacturers: they tend to benefit those with fleets that obtain lower fuel consumption 
than competitors (Greene, Patterson, Singh, & Li, 2005, p. 758). These impacts can be 
lessened through size-based feebates, which normalize the rebate or fee according to 
vehicle interior volume, footprint, or some other measure of vehicle size. Additionally, a 
feebate system applied across the entire fleet might be cheaper and more efficient than 
the internal pricing strategies that individual automakers undertake to meet CAFE 
standards. 
A weakness of feebates is that they only influence new vehicles entering the fleet. 
They are also susceptible to the rebound effect of increased travel in response to reducing 
the cost of travel through lower fuel consumption (Levenson & Gordon, 1990, p. 413). It 
may be possible to game the system if the feebate schedule is designed in discrete “steps” 
rather than a continuous function (Keenan, 2007). Finally, to the extent that the response 
of manufacturers to a feebate forms a large portion of the overall impact, separate state 
feebate systems may not be as successful as a unified national system that sends a clear 
signal to automakers (HLB Decision Economics Inc., 1999, p. 11). 
Table 8 provides a summary of feebate studies. DRI/McGraw-Hill studied the 
feebate rates required achieve two targets: a stabilization of fuel use and reduction in fuel 
use by 20%. The demand response from consumers was approximated by assuming fixed 
consumer budgets and only considering fuel consumption reductions from shifts between 
classes of vehicles, rather than shifts within classes. DRI/McGraw-Hill justified this 
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approximation by their estimate that demand response is a small amount (4 to 18%) of 
the total reduction in new vehicle fuel consumption. The study found that feebate rates of 
$425 per L / 100 km on average were required to stabilize fuel use, and rates of $1,500 
per L / 100 km were required to achieve a 20% reduction in fuel use (W. B. Davis, 
Levine, Train, & DuLeep, 1995, p. 10).  
Greene, 1991 assessed the level of fees and rebates required to incentivize short-
term improvements in the fuel consumption of vehicles produced by GM, Ford, and 
Chrysler. The study found that small improvements—on the order of a 4% reduction in 
new car fuel consumption—could be achieved through short-term changes in consumer 
demand at costs competitive with engineering and design changes, but that larger 
improvements were two to five times as expensive as technology improvements. Greene 
did not attempt to model the longer-term supply response. 
Davis et al. conducted a detailed study of different feebate systems across 
different rates, one- and two-pivot point schedules, non-linear feebates, and size-based 
feebates. They assessed both supply and demand responses, accounting for sales-shifts 
across 19 vehicle classes and within 95 subclasses. This approach allowed greater 
accuracy in modeling the consumer response to feebates, since it captured shifts within 
vehicle classes as well as between classes. They also calculated the change in consumer 
surplus—or the value derived by consumers from vehicle attributes such as price, fuel 
cost, shoulder room, luggage space, weight, and horsepower—in addition to fuel savings 
and GHG reduction benefits (Train, Davis, & Levine, 1997). 
Fuel consumption improvements on the order of 10 to 15% were found to be 
possible between 1990 and 2010, resulting in cumulative fuel savings of some 300 billion 
liters and an 800 Mt reduction in CO2 emissions. Similar to the DRI/McGraw-Hill study, 
it was found that the supply response from manufacturers accounted for around 90% of 
the total improvement in vehicle fuel consumption. Consumer surplus was found to 
increase for all of the feebate systems assessed—intervention resulted in a new-vehicle 
mix preferred by consumers compared to what would have been provided in a free 
market. The authors speculate that this may due to market risk associated with 
introducing new technologies, or a result of competition amongst new- and used-vehicle 
markets (Train, Davis, & Levine, 1997, pp. 11-12). 
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Table 8: Summary of feebate studies 
SOURCE DESCRIPTION PIVOT TYPE RATE CHANGE IN 
NEW VEHICLE FC21 
SUPPLY SIDE 
RESPONSE 
CONSUMER 
SURPLUS22 
PRODUCER 
REVENUE 
   [$ per L/ 100km] [$ / gallon] [%] [% of total] [$ billion, 2005] [$ billion, 2005] 
DRI / 
McGraw-
Hill, 1991 
Studied feebates necessary to:  
1. stabilize FC in vehicles, and 
2. reduce FC by 20%. 
Single pivot with 
increasing rate 
$425 (avg.) 
$1500 (avg.) 
$1.00 
$3.25 
Stabilize FC 
20% reduction in FC 
82 to 96% -- -- 
Greene, 
1991 
Studied feebates needed to meet a 
reduction in FC at const consumer 
surplus. Only considered demand 
response for Chrysler, Ford, GM 
cars for one model year in 1986. 
Not applicable 
$250 - $600 
$650 - $1650 
$0.5 
$1.25 - $3.50 
4% 
13% 
Did not 
consider supply 
response from 
manufacturers 
Held constant Not applicable 
Davis, et al. 
1996 
Studied supply and demand 
response in cars and trucks for 
foreign, domestic automakers over 
15-year period between 1995 to 
2010. 
Separate pivot for 
cars & light trucks 
 
 
Single pivot 
$225 
 
$425 
 
$225 
$0.5 
 
$1.00 
 
$0.5 
12% (new cars) 
10% (new light trucks) 
15% (new cars) 
12% (new light trucks) 
12% (new cars) 
10% (new light trucks) 
93% 
 
88% 
 
93% 
+$7623 
 
+$8323 
 
+$7023 
-0.7% in sales 
 
-0.2% in sales 
 
+0.2% in sales 
HLB, 1999 Studied feebates in Canada over 
20-year period from 2000 to 2020. Single pivot point $350
24
 $0.75 20% to 30% 44%25 -$5.9 to -$11.726 -$5.6 to -$6.727 
Greene, 
2005 
Re-examined feebates w/ recent 
national vehicles sales data over a 
10 to 15-year period from 2000. 
Separate pivot 
point for cars and 
light trucks 
$225 
$425 
$0.5 
$1.00 
13% 
23% 
96% 
95% 
-$2.3 to +$12.728 
-$7.3 to +$10.228 
+$1.7 to +$48.4329 
+$0.5 to +$49.6 
  Single pivot point $225 $0.5 14% Nearly all -$2.428 +$0.2 
 
                                                 
21
 Percentage reduction in new vehicle fuel consumption from projected baseline. Note that the baseline differs across the different analyses. 
22
 Cumulative discounted change in surplus given in 2005 dollars using the Bureau of Labor and Statistics Inflation Calculator (www.bls.gov). 
23
 Accounts for the value consumers derive from changes in vehicle attributes including vehicle price, fuel cost of travel, shoulder room, luggage space, weight, and horsepower of vehicles. Does not include 
benefits from fuel savings and greenhouse gas emission reductions (Train, Davis, & Levine, 1997, p. 6) 
24
 Approximated from maximum fee of -$4,000 and maximum rebate of $1,450 assuming fuel consumption range from 5 L / 100 km to 20 L / 100 km across all cars and light trucks in the 2000 model year (HLB 
Decision Economics Inc., 1999, p. 8) 
25
 Calculated from a consumer-only reduction of 19 Mt in CO2-equivalent emissions (i.e. no manufacturer response) divided by a total reduction of 33 Mt (i.e. including both consumer- and manufacturer-
response) (HLB Decision Economics Inc., 1999, pp. 24, 26)
 
26
 Net present value of the extra vehicle cost to consumers between 2000 and 2020, minus fuel savings using a 5% discount rate (see table in Appendix D, HLB Decision Economics Inc., 1999, pp. 57-58) 
27
 Net present value of manufacturer revenue loss between 2000 and 2020 using a 5% discount rate (see table in Appendix D, HLB Decision Economics Inc., 1999, pp. 57-58). 
28
 The change in value that consumers attach to: the price of the vehicle, and the expected discounted present value of fuel costs (Greene, Patterson, Singh, & Li, 2005, p. 773). Low end assumes consumers 
undervalue fuel savings over an undiscounted 3-year period; high end assumes consumers value fuel savings over a 14-year vehicle lifetime at a rate of 6%. A high end case was not evaluated for the single pivot 
point. 
29
 The net change in manufacturer’s revenues, including lost sales and increased revenue from the added value of technologies that improve fuel consumption. Low end assumes consumers undervalue fuel 
savings over an undiscounted 3-year period; high end assumes consumers value fuel savings over a 14-year vehicle lifetime at a rate of 6%. A high end case was not evaluated for the single pivot point. 
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HLB Decision Economics undertook a study of feebates in the Canadian vehicle 
market. They investigated supply and demand responses using the same vehicle 
subclasses used by Davis et al. (1995). The study focused on the effect of a Canada-only 
feebate system relative to a harmonized feebate with the U.S., and found that greater 
reductions were possible at lower cost due to economies of scale and the quicker 
manufacturer response under a harmonized system (HLB Decision Economics Inc., 1999, 
p. 21). HLB found that consumers would face increased costs from the change in vehicle 
price due to a feebate system, and producers would incur losses from lower vehicle sales 
(p. 18). 
The HLB study found that the supply-side response accounted for only 44% of 
the total reduction in GHG emissions—a much lower share than estimated by other 
feebate modeling studies. The smaller supply-side response may be a result of the 
model’s assumption that “manufacturers respond to fees rather than rebates” (p. 14), 
which is at odds with the response from manufacturers anticipated by Davis et al. (1996) 
and Greene et al. (2005). To manufacturers, it does not matter “whether a dollar of rebate 
is gained or a dollar of fee is avoided”; theoretically, they will respond as long as the 
marginal incentive provided by the feebate is larger than the opportunity cost of a given 
reduction in fuel consumption (Greene, Patterson, Singh, & Li, 2005, p. 769). The high 
demand-side response in the HLB study may also reflect the fact that the Canadian 
consumers—who are subject to higher fuel taxes and have historically shown a 
preference for vehicles with lower rates of fuel consumption—are more sensitive to price 
changes that discriminate between the fuel consumption of vehicles. 
Greene et al. (2005) re-examined feebates over various rates and pivot points. 
Greene at al. confirmed that supply side responses from manufacturers accounted for 
around 95% of the total improvement in vehicle fuel consumption—a similar result to 
DRI/McGraw-Hill (1991), and Davis et al. (1995). Doubling the sensitivity of the 
consumer response lowered the supply response to 84% of the total improvement. The 
effect of feebates on consumer surplus was found to be highly dependant on the value 
that consumers attach to fuel savings. If consumers undervalue fuel savings (represented 
by using a conservative 3-year undiscounted payback period), consumer surplus was 
found to be slightly reduced by feebate systems. If consumers fully value fuel savings 
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over the 14-year lifetime of a vehicle at a 6% discount rate, the study found that 
consumer surplus increases under a feebate. 
The majority of modeling studies have found that the supply response from 
manufacturers is a large share of the overall impact of a feebate system.  Models typically 
assume that a feebate will incentivize manufacturers to apply technologies that reduce 
fuel consumption until the extra technology costs are offset by the change in fee or 
rebate. This may, to some extent, overlook the complex trade-offs manufacturers must 
make against vehicle attributes within a constrained budget (CAR, 2007). Even with a 
feebate incentive, manufacturers may still prefer to direct technologies to improve the 
power and size of vehicles if the consumer willingness to pay for these attributes is 
higher than the feebate incentive for reducing fuel consumption30. If this is the case, 
modeling studies may overestimated the supply-response from manufacturers to a certain 
extent. 
State-level and national feebates systems have been proposed in the past, although 
no feebate system has been enacted in the United States to date. Gas Guzzler Tax 
mentioned in Section 4.2 is essentially a one-sided feebate system that applies an 
escalating fee to the sale of vehicles with a fuel consumption rate above 10.5 L / 100 km. 
Internationally, feebates appear to be gaining popularity as a way of providing incentives 
to reduce new vehicle fuel consumption. Figure 6 provides a comparison of feebate 
systems in place or proposed around the world. 
Austria has applied a feebate tax to the purchase of new vehicles. The tax is levied 
based on the fuel type, retail price and fuel consumption of the purchased vehicle. 
Depending on whether the vehicle uses gasoline or diesel fuel, the tax rate is calculated 
using the following formulae (Gordon, 2005, p. 55; Tellus Institute, 2002): 
3)-nConsumptio Fuel Price Retail2%  Rate vehicle gasoline (××=  -- (4.1) 
2)-nConsumptio Fuel Price Retail2%  Rate vehicle diesel (××=  -- (4.2) 
The maximum tax rate of the Austrian scheme is capped at 16% of the retail price 
for vehicles that exceed a fuel consumption of 11 L / 100 km. There are no vehicles 
currently on the market which qualify for a rebate under the Austrian system. Gasoline 
vehicles must achieve a fuel consumption lower than 3 L / 100 km, and diesel vehicles 
                                                 
30
 Personal communication with John DeCicco, May 7, 2008. 
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must have a fuel consumption below 2 liters per 100 km to qualify for a rebate. The 
Toyota Prius has the lowest overall fuel consumption for gasoline vehicles of 4.3 L / 100 
km, while the Volkswagen Polo achieves the lowest consumption for diesel vehicles of 
3.8 L / 100 km. 
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Figure 6: Comparison of international feebate schedules: (a) Austria; (b) Canada (rebate to be phased out 
in 2009); (c) France (proposed); (d) Ontario, Canada; (e) United States. U.S. and Canada fuel 
consumption values are based on the U.S. CAFE test cycle; European values are based on the NEDC test 
cycle. 
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The Canadian Government announced two measures as part of a Vehicle 
Efficiency Incentive in the 2007 Budget. The ecoAUTO program establishes rebates for 
new cars getting 6.5 L / 100 km or better, and new light trucks getting 8.3 L / 100 km or 
better (Transport Canada, 2007a). An excise tax on fuel cars (dubbed “the Green Levy”) 
applies to new automobiles, but not pick-up trucks, or vans equipped to carry ten or more.  
The fee is levied according to four tiers, ranging from $1,000 for vehicles that get 13 to 
14 L / 100 km to $4,000 for those that consume above 16 L / 100 km (Canada Revenue 
Agency, 2007). 
In 2008, the Canadian Government announced that the ecoAuto Rebate program 
will be phased out in 2009, two years after its enactment  (Parkinson, 2008). This is likely 
a result of criticism that the program received during its implementation. First, the 
feebate includes a wide “zero-band” across which no fee or rebate applies. This band 
straddles a wide range of vehicle models; of 1,040 offerings in the 2007 model year, only 
167 are affected by the feebate. Second, the discrete schedule penalized manufacturers 
over trivial differences in fuel consumption31. Finally, the Government has been 
criticized for implementing the program too quickly without enough consultation or 
notice given to industry. This may have impacted the ability of manufacturers—
particularly North American automakers—to respond to the feebate through supply-side 
technology improvements (Banerjee, 2007, p. 8). Jaccard and Rivers estimate that the 
feebate system could reduce Canada’s GHG emissions by at most 8 Mt CO2-equivalent in 
2020, or less than one percent of their estimate of Canada’s 2020 GHG emissions under 
business-as-usual (Jaccard & Rivers, 2007, pp. 19,20). 
Since 1990, the Government of Ontario, a province of Canada, has imposed a 
feebate on the sale of new vehicles based on their rate of fuel consumption. The Tax for 
Fuel Conservation is primarily a revenue-generating tax with a small rebate component 
for vehicles that with a fuel consumption below 6 L / 100 km. Barg et al. estimate that the 
feebate has had a small impact on the fuel consumption of vehicles sold in the province, 
since the rebate and fee amounts are small; 90% of cars fall within the mid-range $75 tax 
                                                 
31
 For the 2008 model year, Honda Canada lowered the Fit’s fuel consumption by one-tenth of liter per 100 
km in order to qualify for a $1,000 rebate (Keenan, 2007). 
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bracket, and consumers are not informed of the feebate until after they have purchased a 
vehicle (2000). 
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Figure 7: Increase in retail price per unit improvement in fuel consumption for cars and light trucks, 
compared with rates of fees and rebates in various countries. Results are shown for current and future 
powertrains relative to No Change in fuel consumption from today. 32 
On December 5, 2007 the French government announced that it would pursue a 
feebate program for new vehicles based on grams of CO2 emitted per kilometer. The 
program adds an extra payment if a vehicle of more than 15 years is scrapped at the same 
time as a new vehicle is purchased. The program also features a large rebate for vehicles 
achieving emissions less than 60 gCO2 per kilometer (2.6 L / 100 km) to promote the 
adoption of low-emitting, primarily electric, vehicles33. French auto manufacturers are 
well-positioned to benefit from the regulation due to their large share of small car sales, 
                                                 
32
 Note that Canada, Ontario, U.S., and France have been approximated as linear rates from non-linear 
feebate schedules. Additionally, many of the fee and rebate rates apply only a narrow range of fuel 
consumption values. 
33
 For more information, see Green Car Congress, http://www.greencarcongress.com/2007/12/france-to-
insti.html, accessed December 10, 2007. 
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and the exclusion of consumptive commercial light vehicles, of which two-thirds are 
French brands (Bussy, 2008). 
Figure 7 compares international fee and rebate rates to the estimated retail price 
increases of various advanced powertrain technologies for cars and light trucks (see 
Section 5.2.1 for retail price estimate details). The feebate rates are sufficient to offset at 
least two-fifths of the increase in retail price in future powertrain options. The 
effectiveness of these feebate systems is reduced by the discrete, non-linear schedules 
that many schemes use, and by the narrow range of fuel consumption values over which 
rates for the U.S. Gas Guzzler Tax, the Canadian and Ontario feebates apply. 
From a review of the literature on feebates and their international implementation, 
the following can be suggested: 
• Based on modeling studies, feebate rates on the order of $225 per L/100 km to 
$500 per L/100 km are sufficient to incentivize lower rates of fuel consumption 
in new vehicles, both in the demand-side response from consumers and the 
supply-side response from manufacturers. 
• Modeling studies of U.S. feebate systems have found that the supply-side 
response is an order of magnitude greater than the demand-side response 
triggered by a feebate system, accounting for 90 to 95 percent of the total 
improvement in vehicle fuel consumption (W. B. Davis, Levine, Train, & 
DuLeep, 1995, pp. 82-83; Greene, Patterson, Singh, & Li, 2005, pp. 769-770). 
• Many of the feebate rates implemented internationally are sufficient to offset 
estimated retail price increases of various advanced powertrain technologies. 
The effectiveness of these systems is impaired by the use of discrete, non-
linear schedules that often only apply across a small range of fuel consumption 
values. 
• As concerns over energy security and climate change heighten, feebates are 
being increasingly considered as viable policy instruments. Feebate systems 
have typically employed much higher levels of fees than rebates. This suggests 
they are often used as revenue generation taxes rather than revenue-neutral 
instruments for reducing the fuel consumption of new vehicles. 
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4.4 Fuel taxes 
Fuel taxes are levied on the sale of gasoline, diesel, and other transportation fuels. 
Taxes of this kind are justified by governments for the following reasons (Parry & Small, 
2005): 
• They are an efficient way of raising government revenue. 
• They directly influence the price of fuel, and can correct for externalities such 
as: the environmental damage from local air pollutants and carbon dioxide 
emissions produced by the combustion of fuels, and economic losses from 
dependence upon petroleum-based fuels. 
• They indirectly influence the price of travel, and can partially correct for 
externalities such as congestion and traffic-related accidents that consumers 
might not otherwise take into account in their travel decisions. 
• They act as a user-fee for the use of publicly-provided roads and highways 
(Gordon, 2005, p. 26; Wachs, 2003). 
Of these rationale, internalizing the cost of carbon dioxide emissions in the price 
of fuel is most closely aligned with reducing GHG emissions from light-duty vehicles. 
This is analogous to the use of carbon taxes as a means of including the costs of climate 
change impacts into the price of activities that release GHG emissions. Typically, carbon 
taxes are expressed in terms of dollars per metric ton of carbon dioxide emissions, or 
simply in terms of dollars per metric ton of carbon. When applied to fuels, carbon taxes 
can be converted into a dollar per gallon amount which forms a portion of the fuel tax. 
The carbon price can be expressed as a fraction of the price of fuel with the 
following conversion (W. B. Davis, Levine, Train, & DuLeep, 1995, p. 39): 

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Price Carbon  Price Fuel 2
205,21
20
 -- (4.3) 
Where carbon price is the price of one metric ton of GHG emissions in carbon 
dioxide equivalent and fuel price is expressed in dollars per gallon of gasoline. Using this 
conversion, a carbon tax of $100 per metric ton of carbon ($27 per ton of carbon dioxide) 
is equivalent to a fuel tax of $0.25 cents per gallon of gasoline. 
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The primary advantage of fuel taxes are that they promote reductions in fuel use 
in a cost-effective manner, particularly relative to vehicle standards (Austin & Dinan, 
2005; CBO, 2002). Changes in fuels taxes broadly affect the price of fuel and the cost of 
driving a given distance across all on-road vehicles. As a result, they have an important 
impact on the total demand for both private vehicle travel and fuel use. 
In particular, changes in fuel tax induce two distinct responses. Over the short-
term (within one year or so), consumers increase or reduce the amount they travel in 
response to price changes. Travel can be reduced by eliminating inefficient trips, 
carpooling, and switching modes of transportation (e.g. shifting from private to public 
transportation). Recent literature suggests that income growth and improved rates of fuel 
consumption in vehicles have insulated consumers from short-term increases in fuel 
price, reducing this effect to as much as one-fifth of what it was in the 1980’s (CBO, 
2008; Small & Dender, 2007a). 
Over the longer-term, consumers alter their purchase decisions with regards to 
vehicles’ rates of fuel consumption. For instance, if fuel price increases are sustained 
over a longer-term period of five to fifteen years, consumers gradually begin to replace 
their vehicles with models that have lower rates of fuel consumption. Manufacturers, in 
turn, respond to this demand by implementing technologies and vehicle designs that 
emphasize reduced fuel consumption over other attributes. Empirical estimates suggest 
that this response may be from three to seven times larger than the short-term response 
from consumers (CBO, 2008, p. xi). 
The following elasticities of response are representative of recent studies that 
have investigated and summarized these effects (CBO, 2008; Small & Dender, 2007a, 
2007b): 
• For a 10% increase in the fuel cost of travel: consumers respond with a 0.3% 
decrease in annual vehicle travel over the short term, growing linearly to a 
1.0% reduction in travel over 10 years, under sustained fuel price increases. 
This is the elasticity of annual travel with respect to the fuel cost of travel 
(εtravel, per-km cost). 
• For a 10% increase in fuel price (i.e. $ / liter): manufacturers to consumer 
demand respond by reducing new vehicle fuel consumption to produce a 0.3% 
 55
decrease in fuel use over the short-term, growing linearly to a 1.7% reduction 
within 15 years, and a 3.3% reduction over 30 years, assuming sustained fuel 
price increases. This is the elasticity of fuel consumption with respect to fuel 
price (εfuel consumption, price). 
The elasticity of overall fuel use with respect to fuel price (εfuel, price) is given by 
(Austin & Dinan, 2005, p. 572): 
price n,consumptio fuelpricen,consumptio fuelcost kmpertravelpricefuel εεεε ++= − )1(,,  -- (4.4) 
With the values above, this gives a price elasticity of fuel use of -0.25 in 2020 and 
-0.40 in 2035. These are within the range of values from econometric analyses cited in 
literature, although there is considerable variation in elasticity estimates (Espey, 1996; 
Goodwin, Dargay, & Hanly, 2004; Greene, Kahn, & Gibson, 1999; Greening, Greene, & 
Difiglio, 2000; Small & Dender, 2007a). Section 5.3 provides a sensitivity analysis on a 
range of elasticity values. 
Higher rates of fuel taxation and lower rates of vehicle fuel consumption are 
correlated internationally. Figure 8 shows gasoline taxes as a percentage of the cost of 
gasoline across the United States, Japan, Europe, and Canada. European countries apply 
very high taxes relative to the actual cost of the fuel; Japan and Canada are more 
moderate, while the U.S. taxes gasoline at the lowest rate in the OECD. 
Alongside the high rate of fuel taxation in Europe, new vehicles in France, 
Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom have shown a much greater emphasis on 
reducing fuel consumption relative to the light-duty fleet in the U.S. During the late-
1990’s, more than half of the efficiency improvements in new cars coming onto the road 
in these countries were used to reduce fuel consumption (Bodek & Heywood, 2008, p. 
22). 
Italy is particularly noteworthy, having realized 80% of the total fuel consumption 
reduction that would have been possible at constant size and performance, even with a 
lower gasoline tax rate relative to other European countries over the same period. In the 
U.S., however, very little of the improvements in vehicle efficiency have been used to 
improve fuel consumption; instead, horsepower increased by nearly 15% while sales-
weighted average fuel consumption in U.S. cars remained essentially flat between 1995 
and 2006 (EPA, 2007b). 
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Figure 8: International as a percentage of fuel price from 1978 to 2006 (IEA, 2007 Energy End-Use Prices 
in US/toe, PPP/unit) 
 
Table 9: Fraction of the potential fuel consumption reduction (at constant size and performance) realized 
in vehicles across different countries (An & DeCicco, 2007, p. 9; Bodek & Heywood, 2008, p. 23) 
COUNTRY PERIOD EMPHASIS ON REDUCING FUEL CONSUMPTION34 [%] 
United States 1995 - 2006 8 
France 1995 – 2006 68 
Germany 1995 – 2006 54 
Italy 1995 – 200135 83 
United Kingdom 1995 – 200135 52 
 
                                                 
34
 See Bandivadekar (2008, p. 71). Emphasis on reducing fuel consumption (ERFC) describes the ratio of 
actual fuel consumption reduction realized on-road to the fuel consumption reduction possible at constant 
vehicle size and performance. 
35
 Due to data availability, the emphasis on reducing fuel consumption could only be calculated over 1995 
to 2001 for Italy and the United Kingdom. 
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While the main benefit of fuel taxes is their cost-effectiveness in reducing fuel 
use, they are at a disadvantage politically. A broad range of stakeholders are generally 
aligned against tax increases. In the past, these groups have included the tourism services 
industry, road contractors, taxicab companies, truckers, farmers, fuel provides, auto 
makers, labor unions, and general public opinion. A concern is that tax increases will hit 
low-income and rural groups hardest and transfer large amounts of wealth from 
consumers to the government (Nivola, 1986, pp. 210-220). As a result, only modest fuel 
tax increases have been possible within the United States in real dollar terms (Figure 9). 
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Figure 9: Historical U.S. gasoline tax rates36 (BLS, 2008; FHWA, 1995; , 2004 Table MF205) 
At the same time, the evidence is mounting that too-cheap gasoline is imposing 
societal costs that will need to be incorporated into the price of fuel—potentially sooner 
rather than later. First, the external costs of private transportation are not fully 
internalized in the price of fuel in the United States. This promotes higher rates of fuel 
consumption and greater vehicle travel than if fuel was taxed at a socially optimal level. 
Parry and Small (2005) recently examined what level of gasoline tax would be necessary 
to optimally account for the external costs of congestion, accidents, local air pollution, 
GHG emissions, and the balance between fuel and labor taxes for revenue generation. 
Their results, summarized in Table 10 show that the optimal rate of taxation is estimated 
to be $1.21 in 2007 dollars—over two and a half times the current average fuel tax of 
$0.47 per gallon37. 
                                                 
36
 Due to a discrepancy in the FHWA data, average state tax rates were not available for 2005 and 2006. 
37
 U.S. average of federal, state, and local taxes. See (API, 2008) 
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Table 10: Components of an optimal gasoline tax in the U.S. (Parry & Small, 2005, p. 1283, Table 1) 
COMPONENT OPTIMAL TAX 
[2007 cents per gallon] 
Congestion38 34 
Accidents 31 
Pollution from NOx, HC, CO emissions, 
regulated on a distance basis 19 
Pollution from GHG emissions (CO2 
emissions, proportional to fuel use) 6 
Revenue generation39 31 
Total optimal gasoline tax rate 121 
 
Second, fuel tax increases are a straightforward and increasingly essential means 
of raising revenue to maintain America’s highways. From an equity perspective, taxes 
and fees placed on private vehicle use should balance government expenditures on the 
infrastructure and services provided for private vehicles (Delucchi, 2007; Wachs, 2003). 
In the U.S., there is strong evidence that vehicle users do not current pay enough to offset 
the level of investment required to sustain and improve surface transportation 
infrastructure. 
Nearly all of federal government spending on surface transportation comes 
through the Highway Trust Fund (HTF), a fund established in 1954 to cover federal 
highway expenditures. Although HTF revenues swelled in 1997, recent increases in 
spending have dramatically reduced the balance of the HTF (CBO, 2007, pp. 3-4). As a 
result, the Highway Account—the portion of the HTF responsible for highway funding—
is projected to carry a negative balance beginning in 2009 if no corrective action is taken 
(see Table 11). 
 
 
 
                                                 
38
 The congestion term includes a one-cent “congestion feedback” effect on labor supply from reduced 
congestion. See Parry and Small, 2005, p. 1280. 
39
 “Revenue generation” here does not suggest the level of taxation necessary to recoup government 
expenditures on highway infrastructure. Instead, it refers to the optimal level of fuel taxation relative to 
labor taxes as a source of government revenue. 
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Table 11: Projected end-of year balances for the Highway Account from 2006 to 2010 (Adapted from CBO, 
2007, p. 9, Table 5). 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
 [billions of dollars] 
Estimated outlays 33.9 35.7 39.4 41.5 42.8 
Transfer to Mass Transit account 1.4 0.3 0.7 0.9 0.9 
Estimated receipts 33.6 35.2 35.9 36.7 37.5 
Projected balance 8.9 8.1 3.9 -1.7 -8.1 
 
To keep the Highway Account solvent, a nine-to-three majority on the blue-
ribbon National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Commission panel 
recommended an immediate 25 to 40-cent increase in the federal fuel tax between 2008 
and 2013. This is more than double the current federal rate of 18.3 cents per gallon (4.8 
cents per liter). The Commission estimated that between 2020 and 2050, equivalent 
increases in the fuel tax would be on the order of 50 to 85 cents per gallon (13.2 to 22.5 
cents per liter) in order to improve highway performance measures40 relative to today 
(see Table 12). 
Table 12: Estimated levels of investment required under High Capital Investment scenario (National 
Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission, 2008, p. 6) 
 
Currently 
sustainable 
2005 - 2020 2020 - 2035 2035 – 2055 
Low High Low High Low High 
Level of capital investment 
[billions, const. $] 68 207 240 182 250 185 276 
Funding gap41 
[billions, const. $] -- 139 172 114 182 117 208 
Equivalent fuel tax increase 
req’d. [const. $ per gallon] -- 0.71 0.88 0.54 0.85 0.49 0.85 
 
The immediate increase in fuel tax recommended by the Surface Transportation 
Panel corresponds well with Delucchi (2007), who estimated that user payments for 
vehicle infrastructure and services fall short of government expenditures by roughly 20 
cents per gallon (5.3 cents per liter). When indirect government expenditures and general 
                                                 
40
 Highway performance measures considered by the Panel include: average delay on urban principal 
arteries, total delay on all Federal-aid highways, and the percentage of vehicle travel on roads with an 
acceptable pavement ride quality. 
41
 Calculated by subtracting the currently sustainable level of investment from level required in each future 
time period. 
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taxes and fees are included, the total shortfall could be as high as 70 cents per gallon 
(18.5 cents per liter).  
Third, in terms of the burden fuel taxes place on low-income households, studies 
have shown that these groups do spend a higher fraction of their income and expenditures 
on gasoline. At the same time, the disparity is less pronounced when gasoline spending is 
compared relative to long-term income or annual expenditures than it is when compared 
against annual income. It is believed that these measures may be more accurate 
representations of the gasoline tax burden than annual income (CBO, 2002, p. 30). 
Additionally, government transfer payments or income tax rebates to low-income 
households can be used to reimburse extra expenditures on gasoline. For example, 
Metcalf shows how payroll tax rebates could offset the regressive effects of an economy-
wide $15 per metric ton of CO2 ($55 per ton carbon) tax that would increase household 
gasoline spending by 9% (2007; Table 6, p. 6). 
Finally, it should be noted that fuel taxes alone are not the only way to send a 
signal to consumers through the fuel cost of travel. Pay As You Drive or Pay At the 
Pump insurance programs (see Section 4.5) are a means of increasing the cost of travel by 
shifting the up-front costs of insurance to a variable rate. Over the longer-term, road 
charging and mileage-based user fees that are able to differentiate rates by time of day 
(i.e. peak versus off-peak hours), location (i.e. congested city center versus rural roads), 
and perhaps even vehicle type may be the most efficient and equitable solution beyond 
2025 to 2030 (National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission, 
2008; Wachs, 2003). 
The following observations are made from this review of the literature and 
international experience with fuel taxation: 
• Fuel taxes are seen as a cost-effective way to enable a broad range of fuel use 
reduction strategies in an administratively-simple framework. 
• Fuel taxes account directly for the costs of GHG emissions and oil market 
imperfections. They indirectly account for local air pollution, congestion, and 
accident costs. Collectively, this second group of externalities have been 
estimated to be 14 times larger than costs imposed by GHG emissions (Parry & 
Small, 2005). 
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• The main disadvantages of increases in the fuel tax are its regressive effect on 
low-income consumers, and its impact on a broad range of stakeholders are 
generally aligned against these tax increases. 
• At the same time, the need for revenue to offset negative balances in the 
Highway Account of the HTF may provide an immediate, short-term driver for 
dramatic increases. 
• To some extent, concerns over the distributional impacts of fuel tax increases 
can be mitigated though appropriate re-distribution of revenue through 
government transfer payments or income and payroll tax rebates. 
• Finally, fuel taxes are not the only measure available; Pay As You Drive or 
road charging systems similarly reduce vehicle travel and directly account for 
local air pollution, congestion, and accident-related externalities. Over the long 
term, transitions to road charging systems that differentiate by time, location, 
and vehicle type may provide the most effective method of taxation. 
• In the short-term: fuel tax increases on the order of 2 to 3 times the current 
average federal and state tax rate of $0.47 per gallon ($0.12 per liter) are 
justifiable on grounds of economic efficiency (internalizing costs of fuel use) 
and equity (private vehicles should pay their way). 
4.5 Pay As You Drive 
Motorists that drive often are more likely to get into an accident than others who 
drive less. Currently, automobile insurance is paid in an annual lump-sum amount that 
has been likened to an “all-you-can-eat buffet” (Bordoff & Noel, 2008). Once the lump-
sum amount is paid, people tend to over-consume—in this case by driving further than 
they would if the price of insurance took into account their amount of travel relative to 
other consumers. 
A Pay As You Drive (PAYD) system would correct this to a certain extent by 
rolling the up-front costs of annual insurance payments into a price per unit of distance 
traveled42. Under such a system, individuals who drive below-average would pay lower 
                                                 
42
 A similar Pay At The Pump (PATP) system is discussed later and would roll insurance into a fuel 
surcharge paid at during refueling. 
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premiums, while those who travel above-average would pay more; the premium of the 
average driver would remain unchanged. By calculating premiums on a pay-as-you-drive 
basis, rather than a all-you-can-drive basis, the approach would provide all drivers with a 
continuous price incentive to reduce vehicle travel. 
There are a number of advantages to PAYD. First, it has been suggested that the 
impact on low-income groups may be progressive since they drive less than higher-
income households (Bordoff & Noel, 2008; Figure 3, p. 9). Second, PAYD insurance 
allows flexibility in accounting for other insurance risk factors, such as age, driving 
history, location, and time of day in addition to the annual distance traveled (Parry, 
2005). Third, it is a potentially feasible alternative to the fuel tax for incorporating 
externalities into the cost of private transportation and reducing growth in vehicle travel. 
Finally, PAYD is a step toward road charging systems that would most effectively 
account for distance-based externalities (congestion, accidents, air pollution), and that are 
viewed as a necessary transition for transportation finance in the long-term. 
Table 13: Summary of Pay As You Drive studies. All prices in $2007. (veh. = vehicle) 
SOURCE AVERAGE PREMIUM 
REDUCTION 
IN VKT 
EQUIV. 
FEDERAL 
GAS TAX 
INCREASE 
BENEFITS 
PRIVATE SOCIETAL 
 [¢ / mi] [¢ / L]43 [%] [%] [$ billion] [$ billion] 
Bordoff & 
Noel (2008)44 6.6 35.5 8 220 
$7.7 
($34 / veh.) 
$51.5 
($225 / veh.) 
Parry (2005) 6.9 37.1 9.1 150 -- $20.5 
Edlin (2003) 5.4 29.3 10 -- $7.2 ($33 / veh.) 
$24.75 
($146 / veh.) 
 
Table 13 summarizes three recent studies of PAYD systems. Edlin (2003) 
developed a model to relate only accident and congestion externalities to a PAYD system 
using state insurance premium data. Parry (2005) assessed the welfare gains from local 
                                                 
43
 Assumes an light-duty fleet average fuel consumption of 11.8 L / 100 km. 
44
 Bordoff & Noel’s estimates of the societal benefits of PAYD are high relative to the other studies. One 
reason is that Parry takes into account the existing tax on gasoline when calculating the external benefits of 
reducing gasoline use; since the tax is already higher than Parry’s estimate of the external costs of gasoline 
use, reducing consumption is a net loss of welfare (2005, p. 290). In contrast, Bordoff & Noel simply 
multiply the reduction in fuel use by the external cost per gallon for a net societal benefit. 
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air pollution, GHG emissions, and oil dependence in addition to accident and congestion 
externalities. Bordoff & Noel (2008) used data from the National Household 
Transportation Survey to disaggregate premiums and welfare impacts by state, but 
accounted for a comprehensive set of externalities similar to Parry. Bordoff & Noel were 
also able to disaggregate welfare effects by income group and location (rural versus 
urban) in order to analyze the distributional impacts of a PAYD system. 
The average premium anticipated across the studies is about 6 cents per mile or 
3.8 cents per km. Assuming the average light-duty vehicle fleet fuel consumption is 
around 11.8 L / 100 km (20 miles per gallon), this is approximately equivalent to $1.20 
per gallon ($0.32 per liter). All of the studies find substantial net social benefits from the 
PAYD system; Bordoff & Noel and Parry estimate that increases on the order of 150 to 
220% of the current 18-cent federal fuel tax would be necessary to achieve the same 
reduction in overall fuel use. Each concludes that PAYD offers a much more efficient 
alternative to the current system of lump-sum insurance premiums. Bordoff & Noel find 
that lower-income households pay less on average under PAYD, and that the same share 
of households pay less in premiums whether urban or rural (2008; 47). 
PAYD may offer benefits, but there are also drawbacks. First, a number of state-
level insurance regulations explicitly forbid PAYD-type premiums or would require 
reforms to accommodate these schemes. Second, there are barriers to entry for new firms 
attempting to launch PAYD insurance systems: regulatory hurdles and over-broad patents 
on PAYD-like auto insurance arrangements may impair their diffusion (Bordoff & Noel, 
2008, pp. 16-19). Third, lower- and middle-income groups may still pay more for 
insurance (Wenzel, 1995, pp. 39-43). Although premiums will more fairly reflect 
consumers’ use of private travel, this may result in distributional issues among certain 
groups that will need to be addressed by policymakers (Bordoff & Noel, 2008, p. 46). 
A final barrier is that implementation of PAYD suffers from a failure of collective 
action. Even though the social benefits are estimated to be large, benefits for individual 
insurance firms are less than the costs of monitoring vehicle mileage. Spill-over effects 
make it difficult for first-movers to fully capture the benefits of implementing PAYD 
(Bordoff & Noel, 2008). Current GPS monitoring systems are priced between $100 to 
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$250 per vehicle45—far larger than the $30 per vehicle benefit that individual insurance 
companies or consumers are estimated to receive (Table 13). Odometer audits may offer 
a lower-cost option for monitoring vehicle mileage that would also avoid the privacy 
concerns over the use GPS monitoring equipment in personal vehicles. 
Another option is Pay at the Pump (PATP), which would see lump-sum insurance 
premiums rolled into the price of gasoline at the pump, rather than a charge based on 
annual vehicle travel. It would not require mileage monitoring, and would have lower up-
front costs than distance-based premiums. Additionally, by levying premiums on the 
amount of fuel consumed, rather than distance traveled, PATP would affect consumer’s 
vehicle purchase decisions as well as reducing annual vehicle travel. 
A drawback to PATP is that it is more difficult to price other risk factors as 
precisely as traditional insurance programs or PAYD. Second, PATP approaches may 
have stronger regressive impacts than PAYD since lower-income households are more 
likely to have older vehicles that consume fuel at a higher rate for the same distance 
traveled. Third, by basing premiums on the amount of fuel consumed, PATP does not 
encourage the same reduction in vehicle travel as an equivalent PAYD scheme. As a 
result, while PATP does encourage lower rates of fuel consumption in vehicles, larger 
externalities that are related to vehicle travel—such as accidents, congestion, and local air 
pollution—will not decrease as much as they would under PAYD (Bordoff & Noel, 2008, 
p. 48). 
PATP proposals have been motivated by efforts to reform auto insurance 
legislation rather than correct the pricing of auto insurance. In California, efforts in the 
mid-1990’s to introduce PATP auto insurance were ultimately unsuccessful (New York 
Times, 1993). In the meantime, improvements in GPS technology and pilot programs 
conducted by insurance companies appear to have renewed interest in PAYD relative to 
surcharges at the pump. Distance-based insurance programs are currently offered by 
Norwich-Union in the United Kingdom (Norwich Union, 2008), and Hollard Insurace in 
South Africa (Hollard Insurance, 2008). Progressive, the U.S. auto insurance firm, is 
planning on launching a PAYD program called MyRate on a pilot basis in six states 
(Dubner & Levitt, 2008). The company already offers discounts from 5 to 25% on 
                                                 
45
 See Bordoff, 2008; Table 1, p. 14 for a summary of available monitoring systems. 
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premiums through a voluntary travel monitoring program called TripSense underway in 
Minnesota, Oregon, and Michigan (Progressive Insurance, 2007). Milemeter, a start-up 
insurance firm will allow consumers to purchase insurance for a specified odometer range 
over the internet, with rates adjusted by geography, age, and vehicle risk factors 
(Milemeter, 2008). There is no data currently available on the performance of these 
programs to date. 
The following suggestions are made based on this review of PAYD and PATP 
proposals: 
• According to economic literature, substantial social benefits (on the order of 
$150 to $225 per insured vehicle) are offered by linking insurance premiums to 
annual travel or fuel use. Suggested premiums are on the order of 6 cents per 
mile, or 32 cents per liter. 
• There is some disagreement in the literature over whether these reforms would 
disproportionately impact low-income groups. While the lowest-income 
households may be better off, mid- and lower-income groups may be 
disproportionately worse off. 
• The implementation of actual PAYD schemes and pilot programs suggest that 
private insurance companies are becoming increasingly interested in linking 
premiums to annual vehicle travel. While regulatory and collective action 
barriers exist, improved mileage tracking technologies and the potential private 
benefits available have renewed interest in PAYD approaches relative to 
PATP. 
• In terms of reducing GHG emissions and fuel use in light-duty vehicles, these 
systems offer a less controversial alternative to fuel taxes as a way of 
incorporating the external costs of private vehicle travel into consumer 
decision-making. 
4.6 Scrappage incentives 
At the final stage of vehicle life, scrappage incentives—also known as voluntary 
vehicle retirement programs—provide rebates to owners who choose to retire aging 
vehicles rather than re-sell them or keep them on the road. To the extent that retired 
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vehicles lead to new vehicle sales, and that these new vehicles travel further on a liter of 
fuel, scrappage programs can increase the rate at which the on-road fleet achieves fuel 
consumption reductions. Interest in scrappage incentive has largely been motivated by 
their impact on local air pollution emissions, as the oldest vehicles on the road are 
responsible for a disproportionate share of total emissions. In California, five local air 
districts offer scrappage incentives as a means of meeting federal ozone standards within 
the state46. 
Scrappage incentives can be combined with feebates or other differentiated 
vehicle taxes in order to promote the adoption of vehicles with lower rates of fuel 
consumption upon retirement of an older vehicle. For example, France’s proposed 
feebate system includes a scrappage incentive for vehicles 15 years or older (see Section 
4.3). British Columbia’s “Scrap-It” program offers a sliding scale of incentives, from 
$1,000 towards a new hybrid vehicle purchase, to $500 for the purchase of a used vehicle 
not older than 1998. 
Two drawbacks to scrappage programs are that they may increase the price of 
used vehicles, which can impact low-income groups who typically purchase older 
vehicles, and that they may increase the migration of older vehicles into the area where 
the incentive is offered, thus offsetting some of the policy’s benefits. One study in 
California found the regressive effect of a scrappage incentive to be smaller than 
expected, with average used car prices increasing by at most 5%, or $300 per vehicle. 
Local emissions reductions were very dependant upon the assumptions made regarding 
the age of vehicles which migrate into the area—under a worst-case assumption, the 
base-case emissions reductions predicted for the incentive were offset by two-thirds 
(Dixon & Garber, 2001; pp. 63 - 64; Table 7.2, p. 58). 
4.7 Summary and discussion 
This chapter has qualitatively reviewed the literature and real-world experience 
with vehicle standards, differentiated vehicle taxes, fuel taxes, pay as you drive programs, 
and scrappage incentives. Table 15 summarizes the results of this assessment, which 
suggest that vehicle standards, such as CAFE form an incomplete approach to addressing 
                                                 
46
 See http://www.arb.ca.gov/msprog/avrp/avrpfaq.htm, accessed May 2, 2008. 
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the full menu of opportunities available for reducing fuel use and GHG emissions from 
light-duty vehicles for the following reasons: 
1. Vehicle standards act directly on manufacturers, but a broad range of 
stakeholders influence energy use and GHG emissions. Bringing these groups 
into a coordinated policy framework enables a wide range of reduction 
opportunities through technological and behavioral change. 
2. There is a trend towards mandatory and tighter regulation of vehicle fuel 
consumption across developed countries in the world. At the same time, fiscal 
approaches have a role to play in aligning the interests of manufacturers and 
consumers in achieving reductions without the use of perverse incentives and 
loopholes. 
3. There are numerous opportunities to reduce energy use and emissions along the 
entire vehicle life-cycle. Policy drivers that influence the choices of 
manufacturers and consumers can be applied at the time of vehicle design, 
production, purchase, operation, and retirement. Without addressing these 
different life-cycle stages, a measure may unintentionally alter the behavior of 
stakeholders in ways that reduce the effectiveness of policy interventions. 
Table 14 integrates the policy options reviewed in this chapter by policy type, 
stakeholder group, and life-cycle stage. This sample package shows how these options 
might be combined in a coordinated policy framework. 
Table 14: A sample coordinated policy package for reducing the fuel consumption of vehicles. 
STAKEHOLDER 
VEHICLE LIFE-CYCLE STAGES 
Production Purchase Operation Retirement 
Manufacturers CAFE (Feebates) -- -- 
Consumers -- Feebates Pay as you drive / Fuel tax 
Scrappage 
Incentive 
Non-italics = regulatory mandate 
Italics = fiscal incentive 
A mandatory vehicle standard such as CAFE would establish a binding fuel 
consumption target on manufacturers. At the time of purchase, feebates would reward 
buyers for selecting new vehicles with lower fuel consumption, while providing 
manufacturers with an incentive to equip vehicles with technologies that reduce the rate 
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of consumption. Customers who elect to pay fees on larger, more powerful and 
consumptive vehicles would effectively subsidize these improvements. 
Following vehicle purchase, increases in the federal fuel tax could encourage 
consumers to adopt less-consumptive vehicles through a long-term and consistent price 
signal. Income or payroll tax rebates could be used to mitigate the impact of fuel tax 
increases on lower income vehicle users. Alternatively, a pay as you drive, or pay at the 
pump system could be used to increase the fuel cost of travel in a way that is revenue-
neutral for the average driver. At the final stage of the vehicle life-cycle, scrappage 
incentives would provide a rebate to vehicle owners to promote earlier retirement of 
aging vehicles, increasing the rate of turnover in the fleet and encouraging newer vehicles 
with lower rates of fuel consumption to hit the road. 
The combined effect of these policies is consistent and reinforcing: consumers 
respond to fiscal incentives in a way that aligns their desire for reduced fuel consumption 
with regulatory requirements placed on manufacturers. Just as there is no “silver bullet” 
in the technology options available, it is unlikely that one dominant strategy can satisfy 
the necessary political and economic constraints while achieving dramatic reductions in 
energy use and greenhouse gas emissions. The policies outlined above are technology-
neutral, in that they are oriented around relative reductions in vehicle fuel consumption 
rather than the technologies used to achieve these reductions. Finally, they act across the 
entire vehicle life-cycle, providing incentives to reduce fuel use at the time of purchase, 
as vehicles are driven, and in deciding when to retire or re-sell old vehicles. 
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Table 15: Summary of policy measure features 
POLICY GOAL STAGE GROUP ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES ALONGSIDE CAFE 
Vehicle 
standards 
Reduce rates of new 
vehicle FC / GHG 
emissions 
Production Manufacturers Immediate & binding 
effect on new vehicle FC 
and GHG emissions; 
certainty in reduction 
Limited to new vehicle 
FC; costlier; rebound 
effect; may need 
perverse incentives to 
win favor 
-- 
Differentiated 
vehicle taxes 
Incentivize adoption of 
vehicles with lower FC / 
GHG emissions 
Purchase / 
operation 
Consumers Ongoing incentive to 
reduce FC; stimulates 
consumer response; 
administratively simple; 
transition to road pricing 
Double taxation, patch-
work systems may 
reduce effectiveness; 
revenue generation 
instead of fuel reduction 
Ongoing incentive to 
reduce FC; aligns 
consumer demand w/ 
requirement for lower 
FC in new vehicles 
Feebates Incentivize adoption of 
vehicles with lower FC / 
GHG emissions 
Purchase Consumers 
(with 
manufacturer 
response) 
Ongoing incentive to 
reduce FC; stimulates 
consumer response; 
possibly revenue-
neutral; progressive 
Disproportionate impact 
on manufacturers (size-
based system can help); 
rebound effect; discrete 
rates harm effectiveness 
Incentive for lower FC 
eases burden of 
manufacturer’s internal 
pricing strategy; demand 
response helps 
Fuel tax / 
carbon tax 
Correct fuel use 
externalities; efficiently 
raise revenue; charge for 
use of infrastructure 
Operation Consumers 
(with 
manufacturer 
response) 
Cost-effective; lowers 
travel, FC; stimulates 
consumer response; 
administratively simple; 
can price externalities 
Impacts broad range of 
interests aligned against 
tax increases; regressive; 
large wealth transfer to 
government 
Offset rebound effect by 
reducing travel; aligns 
consumer demand with 
requirement for lower 
FC in new vehicles 
Pay As You 
Drive / Pay At 
The Pump 
(PATP) 
Charge insurance on an 
equitable basis; remove 
incentive to over-
consume private travel 
Operation Consumers Does not increase fuel 
price; tends to be 
progressive; cost-neutral 
for avg. driver; helps 
shift to road pricing 
Collective action failure, 
regulations, & overbroad 
patents act as barriers; 
no affect on new vehicle 
FC. 
Offset rebound effect by 
reducing travel; PATP 
can align consumer 
demand w/ requirement 
for lower FC  
Scrappage 
incentives 
Reduce length of time 
that oldest vehicles are 
kept on the road; 
improve fleet FC 
Retirement Consumers Increases fleet rate of 
turn-over; improves fleet 
FC; reduces local air 
pollution. 
Has regressive impacts, 
but may be small; 
benefits may be offset 
by migration of older 
vehicles. 
Speeds penetration of 
lower FC vehicles into 
fleet. 
FC = Fuel consumption 
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5.0 Analysis of a coordinated policy 
approach 
Chapter 5 illustrates how a coordinated fiscal policy option interacts with a 
regulatory fuel consumption standard. Using a model of the U.S. light-duty vehicle fleet, 
the first section compares the impact of fuel tax increases in comparison to CAFE 
standards. For each instrument, a stringent policy case out to 2035 is compared against a 
case where political will weakens by 2020 and results in a less aggressive effort to reduce 
fuel consumption in new vehicles. A final case coordinates a fuel tax policy alongside 
CAFE to show how the two policy options interact. 
The second section presents estimates of the cost and benefits obtained by using 
future technologies to reduce vehicle fuel consumption. Using a plausible scenario of 
technology penetration, estimates of the extra costs, fuel savings, and GHG emission 
reductions across new light-duty vehicles are developed for the 2020 and 2035 model 
years. The role that feebates might play in offsetting a portion of these costs is examined. 
The third section varies sensitive parameters to verify the robustness of the conclusions 
drawn from the preceding sections.  
5.1 Policy cases 
This section describes the development of two illustrative policy scenarios 
relative to a No Change baseline: CAFE legislation, and a fuel tax policy. Based on 
profiles of new vehicle fuel consumption developed for each scenario, the U.S. light-duty 
vehicle fleet model described in Chapter 3 is used to determine the changes vehicle 
travel, fuel use and GHG emissions. The potential for coordinating CAFE and fuel tax 
increases is discussed, highlighting specific features of each instrument and the role that 
they each may play alongside on another. 
 
5.1.1 CAFE policy cases 
Section 4.1 described the CAFE standards legislated by the Energy Independence 
and Security Act (EISA) of 2007. Title I of the bill requires cars and light trucks to 
achieve a combined average fuel consumption rate of at most 6.72 L / 100 km (or at least 
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35 mpg) by 2020. This corresponds to an on-road fuel consumption of 8.20 L / 100 km, 
assuming a 22% adjustment factor between fuel consumption rates measured by the EPA 
and rates experienced in on-road driving47. Beyond 2020, CAFE standards must be set at 
the “maximum feasible average fuel economy” (EISA, 2007). If reducing fuel 
consumption remains a political priority beyond 2020, NHTSA may continue to set 
stringent standards between 2020 and 2035. It is equally possible that the political will 
for reducing fuel consumption will subside, and that only modest improvements will be 
achieved after 202048. 
The CAFE policy cases developed in this section illustrate the impact of the new 
legislation on light-duty vehicle GHG emissions in 2020 and 2035. Due to uncertainty in 
how the standards will be set beyond 2020, two different cases are examined: 
1. A CAFE case where the political will and demand for reducing fuel 
consumption fades by 2020, similar to the period when standards 
remained largely constant between 1985 and 2007. Under this scenario, 
standards remain constant and there is no further improvement in the rate 
of fuel consumption from 2020 to 2035. 
2. A CAFE High case where political will and consumer demand for reduced 
fuel consumption remain strong beyond 2020, enabling NHSTA to 
prescribe stringent increases in CAFE standards. 
Table 16: Annual rates of improvement in new car and light truck on-road fuel consumption assumed for 
the CAFE, CAFE High policy cases. The EIA’s projections for new light duty vehicles under the new CAFE 
legislation are also shown for comparison (EIA, 2008a). 
PERIOD 
CAFE 
[% per year] 
CAFE High 
[% per year] 
EIA Annual Energy Outlook 
2008 [% per year] 
Cars and Light Trucks Cars and Light Trucks Cars Light Trucks 
2010 – 2015 3.7 3.7 2.2 3.1 
2015 – 2020 2.1 2.1 3.7 2.6 
2020 – 2035 0.0 2.3 0.2 0.5 
 
                                                 
47
 This is the same factor used by the World Business Council on Sustainability’s Sustainable Mobility 
Project. See Fulton, Eads (2004, p. 21). 
48
 Although NHSTA was charged with establishing standards at the “maximum feasible [level]” for light 
trucks under the original CAFE legislation, only modest improvements were achieved during the early 
1990’s, and standards were frozen by Congress between 1996 and 2002. See Section 4.1 for details. 
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Table 16 shows the annual rates of improvement in fuel consumption for both 
new cars and light trucks under the CAFE and CAFE High policy cases. For both policy 
cases, the rate of improvement between 2010 and 2020 is roughly 2.9%, which achieves 
the target on-road fuel consumption of 8.20 L / 100 km by 2020 (equivalent to a test 
cycle fuel economy of 35 mpg ). After 2020, fuel consumption remains constant under 
the CAFE case. The CAFE High policy case assumes an annual improvement rate of 
2.3% per year in new vehicle fuel consumption, which nearly halves fuel consumption in 
new cars and trucks from 2010 levels by 2035. Figure 10 shows the projected on-road 
fuel consumption of new cars and light trucks under CAFE and CAFE High. 
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Figure 10: Average on-road fuel consumption of new light-duty vehicles under CAFE and CAFE High 
policy cases relative to No Change49. 
 
If the price of fuel remains relatively constant between 2010 to 2035, the reduced 
rates of vehicle fuel consumption will lower the fuel cost of travel and incentivize 
consumers to drive new vehicles further. The impact of the CAFE policy cases on vehicle 
                                                 
49
 On-road fuel consumption values are obtained by adjusting the CAFE test cycle fuel consumption by a 
factor of 1.22. 
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travel is shown by Figure 11. From the literature reviewed in Section 4.4, the elasticity of 
annual vehicle travel relative to a change in the fuel cost of travel is assumed to be -0.03 
over the short-term and increasing linearly to a long-term maximum of -0.10 by 2015. 
These elasticities are implemented using the methodology described in Section 3.0. 
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Figure 11: Light-duty vehicle travel under the CAFE policy cases relative to No Change. Assumes a 
constant fuel price of $2.50 per gallon ($0.66 per liter) between 2010 and 2035, including state and local 
taxes. 
 The CAFE High policy case results in an increase in vehicle travel of 5% relative 
to No Change by 2035. This increase in travel is caused by the lower rates of fuel 
consumption in new cars and light trucks that enter the fleet between 2010 and 2035. 
Assuming a constant fuel price of $2.50 starting in 2010, the fuel cost of travel for new 
vehicles entering the fleet gradually decreases, resulting in slightly higher rates of travel. 
The increase in vehicle travel is nearly the same in the CAFE case, although reduced by a 
small amount since the average new fleet fuel consumption does not improve between 
2020 to 2035. Even so, vehicle travel remains 3% higher in 2035 under CAFE relative to 
No Change. 
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The total GHG emissions from the light-duty fleet under the CAFE policy cases 
are show in Figure 12. Total emissions include GHGs produced during vehicle operation 
(tank-to-wheels), upstream extraction, refining and transport (well-to-tank), and vehicle 
material lifecycle. Under No Change, emissions increase by 40% in 2035 relative to 
2005. Unsurprisingly, both the CAFE and CAFE High policy cases achieve the same 
11% reduction of in GHG emissions from No Change in 2020—a 6% increase from 2005 
emissions. By 2035, the CAFE High policy case reduces GHG emissions by 32% relative 
to the No Change baseline (or 4% relative to 2005 levels). The CAFE case achieves about 
two-thirds of this reduction, dropping GHG emissions by 21% relative to No Change in 
2035 (an 11% increase relative to 2005 emissions).  
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Figure 12: Light-duty vehicle GHG emissions under CAFE policy cases relative to No Change. 
More importantly, under the CAFE case, GHG emissions are 5% higher in 2035 
than in 2020. The trajectory of emissions is once again increasing under this scenario: 
with no improvement in fuel consumption after 2020, growth in vehicle sales and travel 
begin to offset a portion of the reduction achieved in the previous 10 years. As a result of 
this trajectory, further reductions in light-duty vehicle fuel consumption will be required 
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just to again slow the growth in GHG emissions. This result stresses the importance of 
continuous and long-term improvements in fuel consumption in order to overcome rates 
of growth in vehicle sales and travel. 
 
5.1.2 Fuel tax policy cases 
Fuel tax increases are an administratively simple way of increasing the fuel cost 
of travel. This section develops two fuel tax policy cases to illustrate the effects that 
higher fuel prices could have on vehicle fuel consumption, annual travel, and GHG 
emissions. In this section, two different fuel tax cases are examined: 
1. A Fuel Tax case where fuel tax increases in real 2007 dollars by $0.15 per 
gallon ($0.04 per liter) annually between 2010 until 2020. Beyond 2020, 
there are no increases in the real price of fuel tax. By 2020, the price of a 
gallon of fuel is $4.00 ($1.06 per liter) and remains at this level through 
2035. This is a total tax increase of $1.50 per gallon ($0.40 per liter), 
assuming a base fuel price of $2.50 that includes federal state and local 
taxes of 40 cents on average.  
2. A Fuel Tax High case where fuel tax increases by $0.15 per gallon in real 
2007 dollars between 2010 to 2020, and continues to rise at this rate until 
2035. By 2035 the price of a gallon of fuel is $6.25 ($1.65 per liter). This 
is a tax increase of $3.75 per gallon ($1.00 per liter) by 2035. 
The level of taxation under the Fuel Tax policy case is at the higher bound of 
increases in the fuel tax that were justified in Section 4.4. At the same time, the price of 
GHG emissions is expected to rise over time, and externalities such as congestion, 
accidents, and equitable financing of highway infrastructure provide a strong rationale for 
increases that are on the order of the Fuel Tax case, alongside the need to reduce fuel use 
and emissions. 
This analysis assumes the same elasticity of vehicle travel with respect to the fuel 
cost of travel as for the CAFE policy case, namely -0.03 over the short-term, linearly 
increasing to -0.10 by 2015. The change in new vehicle fuel consumption with respect to 
fuel price is assumed to be -0.03 in the short term, linearly increasing to -0.33 by 2035 
 77
(see Section 4.4). These elasticities were employed using the methodology outlined in 
Section 3.2. 
As described in Section 4.4, increases in the price of fuel will stimulate consumer 
demand for lower rates of fuel consumption in new vehicles. The improvement in new 
vehicle fuel consumption generated by this demand under the Fuel Tax and Fuel Tax 
High cases is shown in Figure 13. Both policy cases provide the same pricing incentive to 
reduce fuel consumption until 2020, resulting in an on-road light duty fleet average of 
10.28 L / 100 km (23 mpg). Beyond 2020, fuel price increases under the Fuel Tax High 
case gradually reduce fuel consumption to a fleet average of 8.14 L / 100 km (29 mpg) in 
2035.  
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Figure 13: Average on-road fuel consumption of new light-duty vehicles under Fuel Tax and Fuel Tax 
High policy cases relative to No Change 
Under the Fuel Tax case, fuel prices remain constant in real terms between 2020 
to 2035. Even so, vehicle fuel consumption continues to drop due to the assumption that 
the elasticity of fuel consumption with respect to fuel price continues to increase until 
2035. That is, even though the fuel price remains constant beyond 2020, the model 
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assumes that consumers continue to adjust to the price changes between 2020 and 2035 
as a result of slow turnover rates in the fleet that are on the order of 15 years. 
Figure 14 shows the changes in vehicle travel for the Fuel Tax and Fuel Tax High 
policy cases relative to No Change. There are two important differences between the fuel 
tax policy cases and CAFE. First, vehicle travel is reduced relative to the No Change 
case; second, the overall change in vehicle travel occurs earlier and is larger in magnitude 
than under CAFE. 
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Figure 14: Annual vehicle travel under Fuel Tax and Fuel Tax High policy cases relative to No Change 
These differences stems from important features of the fuel tax policies. First, 
they increase the fuel cost of travel relative to No Change, which offsets the rebound 
effect to achieve an overall reduction in vehicle travel. Second, tax increases impact the 
entire in-use fleet—both old and new vehicles are affected by the increased fuel cost of 
travel. In fact, older vehicles with higher rates of fuel consumption are affected to a 
greater extent than new, less consumptive models. Under the Fuel Tax High case, the fuel 
cost of travel for the average car made in 2020 is 15 cents per km in 2035—this is 15% 
higher than that of a brand-new car coming onto the road in the 2035 model year. 
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The total GHG emissions from light-duty vehicles under the fuel tax policy cases 
are shown in Figure 15. Under the Fuel Tax policy case, the GHG emissions are reduced 
by 13% compared to No Change. The Fuel Tax High policy reduces GHG emissions by 
21% relative to the No Change baseline. Of this reduction, roughly three-quarters is 
attributable to reductions in vehicle fuel consumption, while the remaining portion is 
achieved through lower vehicle travel. Similar to the CAFE policy case, without further 
increases in the price of fuel beyond 2020, GHG emissions continue to rise between 2020 
and 2035 under the Fuel Tax policy case. 
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Figure 15: Light-duty vehicle GHG emissions under Fuel Tax and Fuel Tax High policy cases relative to 
No Change 
 
5.1.3 Coordinating the policy cases 
The results of the CAFE, fuel tax, and the coordinated policy cases are shown by 
Table 17. The CAFE and CAFE High policy cases achieve reductions of roughly 20 to 
35% in both fuel use and GHG emissions, while the Fuel Tax and Fuel Tax High cases 
achieve reductions of 15 to 23% relative to No Change in 2035. 
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Table 17: Summary of CAFE, fuel tax, and coordinated policy cases 
Policy Case Price of fuel [$ / gallon] 
Avg. new 
vehicle on-road 
fuel consumpt’n 
[L / 100 km] 
Vehicle travel 
[trillion km] 
Fuel use 
[billion liters] 
GHG 
Emissions50 
[MtCO2e] 
 2020 2035 2020 2035 2020 2035 2020 2035 2020 2035 
No Change 2.50 2.50 11.04 11.04 5.98 7.11 661 777 2,155 2,547 
CAFE 2.50 2.50 8.20 8.20 6.07 7.32 583 600 1,923 2,024 
CAFE High 2.50 2.50 8.20 5.78 6.07 7.46 583 508 1,923 1,750 
Fuel Tax 4.00 4.00 10.28 9.44 5.72 6.86 617 669 2,024 2,227 
Fuel Tax 
High 4.00 6.25 10.28 8.14 5.72 6.61 617 599 2,024 2,021 
CAFE + 
Fuel Tax 4.00 4.00 8.20 8.20 5.79 6.98 556 573 1,843 1,942 
CAFE + 
Fuel Tax 
High 
4.00 6.25 8.20 5.78 5.79 6.80 556 463 1,843 1,617 
 
A key difference between the two sets of policy instruments, however, is the 
mechanism by which fuel use and GHG emissions are reduced. Under CAFE, reductions 
come about by the adoption of technologies and alternative powertrains that provide 
efficiency gains that are used to reduce the fuel consumption of vehicles. Manufacturers 
are required to implement the technologies in this fashion regardless of the market 
demand for reductions in fuel consumption.  With these new technologies, the retail price 
of vehicles will increase for the same size and performance. In response, consumers may 
sales mix shift to smaller vehicles. Since the new CAFE standards proposed by NHTSA 
are normalized across vehicle size, smaller vehicles will be required to improve fuel 
consumption as well; manufacturers will not necessarily be able to fulfill their CAFE 
requirements through sales mix shifts alone. Thus, while CAFE provides a means of 
achieving dramatic reductions in new vehicle fuel consumption over a relatively short 
timeframe (10 years), it may well fight an uphill battle if market forces continue to show 
a strong preference for other vehicle attributes. 
In contrast, under the Fuel Tax policy cases, manufacturers are not required to 
direct efficiency gains to reductions in fuel consumption. Instead, as the price of fuel 
                                                 
50
 Includes well-to-tank, well-to-wheel, and material cycle GHG emissions. 
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increases, consumers begin to place more value on lower rates of fuel consumption 
relative to other vehicle attributes. Manufacturers gradually respond to this demand by 
using efficiency improvements to downsize engines and other vehicle components rather 
than increasing the size and power of vehicles. These changes occur over a longer 
timeframe (15 to 25 years) than under CAFE. Some level of sales mix shifting to smaller 
vehicles is likely under the Fuel Tax policy cases, since consumers may elect to 
purchases smaller vehicles that get better rates of fuel consumption. At the same time, 
consumers will also reduce the amount of private vehicle travel they undertake. This can 
be done in various ways, such as shifting from private vehicles to public transportation, 
reducing the number of trips taken, or increasing the number of passengers per vehicle 
through carpooling. 
To illustrate these interactions, the CAFE and CAFE High policy cases were 
combined with the Fuel Tax and Fuel Tax High cases respectively. Since the CAFE 
policy cases examined here achieve lower rates of fuel consumption than the Fuel Tax 
policies provide (see Figure 10 and Figure 13), it was assumed that CAFE remained a 
binding limit on fuel consumption. Alongside CAFE, however, the Fuel Tax policies 
work to offset the rebound effect, reducing vehicle travel and achieving further 
reductions in GHG emissions and fuel use as shown in Figure 16 and Figure 17. The 
result is a dramatic increase in new vehicle fuel consumption through CAFE, with an 
additional contribution from the fuel tax through reduced vehicle travel. 
Finally, although it is harder to quantify, coordination of CAFE with fuel tax 
policies aligns consumer demand with the regulatory fuel consumption requirements. The 
fuel tax policies pull reductions in vehicle fuel consumption into the market at an 
increasing rate, though more gradually than the regulatory push of CAFE manufacturers 
to supply less-consumptive vehicles. To provide some quantitative estimate of this effect, 
the degree of consumer alignment can be measured using the following relation:  
100 
FCFC
FCFC
 [%]  Alignment Consumer of Degree
CAFEChange No
FuelTaxChange No
×
−
−
=  
This ratio of the fuel consumption (FC) benefit under a fuel tax policy relative to 
the benefit under CAFE is a measure of the degree to which market-driven demand for 
lower rates of fuel consumption contributes to the overall reduction mandated by CAFE. 
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Figure 16: Light-duty vehicle GHG emissions under “CAFE + Fuel Tax” relative to No Change 
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Figure 17: Light-duty vehicle GHG emissions under “CAFE High + Fuel Tax High” relative to No Change 
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The degree of consumer alignment for the combined policy cases is shown in 
Table 18. Due to symmetry in how the policy scenarios were developed, the degree of 
consumer alignment is the same for both the CAFE and Fuel Tax combined policy case, 
and the CAFE High and Fuel Tax High combined policy case. In the 2020 model year, 
consumer demand accounts for around a quarter of the regulated reductions in new 
vehicle fuel consumption. By the 2035 model year, the increased responsiveness in 
consumers accounts for half of the required reductions in fuel consumption under the 
CAFE policies. Balancing consumer demand for lower rates of fuel consumption against 
the mandated targets enables manufacturers to meet their CAFE obligations with vehicles 
that are more attractive to buyers.  
Table 18: Fuel cost of travel and degree of consumer alignment with fuel consumption regulations under 
both the CAFE and Fuel Tax combined policy case, and the CAFE High and Fuel Tax High combined 
policy case. All dollar amounts are in real 2007 dollars. 
POLICY CASE MODEL YEAR 2020 2035 
No Change   
Fuel cost of travel [cents / km] 7.5 7.3 
Fuel consumption (FC) [L / 100 km] 11.04 11.04 
CAFE with Fuel Tax    
Fuel cost of travel [2007 cents / km] 10.7 8.9 
FC demanded under fuel tax [L / 100 km] 10.28 9.44 
FC required by CAFE [L / 100 km] 8.20 8.20 
Degree of consumer alignment [%] 27% 55% 
CAFE High with Fuel Tax High   
Fuel cost of travel [cents / km] 10.7 12.0 
FC demanded under fuel tax [L / 100 km] 10.28 8.14 
FC required by CAFE [L / 100 km] 8.20 5.78 
Degree of consumer alignment [%] 27% 55% 
 
Table 18 also includes the average changes in the fuel cost of travel (in $ per km) 
that consumers will face under the combined CAFE and fuel tax policy cases. Under the 
CAFE and Fuel Tax case, the fuel cost of travel increases by 43% relative to No Change 
by 2020, declining to 22% above No Change in 2035 as the fuel tax remains constant and 
new vehicle fuel consumption improves slightly. Under the CAFE High and Fuel Tax 
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High case, the fuel cost of travel continues to increase, and is 64% higher relative to No 
Change in 2035. 
5.2 Engineering costs and changes in vehicle retail price 
The purpose of this section is to quantify the magnitude and cost of introducing 
technologies that can reduce vehicle fuel consumption at a rate roughly equivalent to the 
CAFE policy cases developed in the preceding section. First, cost estimates of future 
vehicle technologies relative to today are provided. Next, using a plausible scenario of 
alternative powertrain technology penetration, aggregate costs across the light-duty fleet 
are developed. Changes in vehicle production costs and retail price increases are 
discussed, as well as the cost of reducing GHG emissions. Finally, the potential for a 
feebate policy to offset increases in production costs and retail prices is briefly examined. 
 
5.2.1 Future vehicle cost estimates 
The incremental retail price increases of different propulsion systems relative to 
current and future gasoline vehicles are shown in Table 19. These retail prices were based 
on production cost estimates summarized in Table 21 and Table 2251. Production costs 
describe those costs associated with producing a vehicle at the manufacturing plant gate; 
they include vehicle manufacturing, corporate overhead, and production overhead. To 
account for distribution costs and manufacturer and dealer profit margins, production 
costs were multiplied by a factor of 1.4 to provide the retail price estimates52.  This is a 
representative retail price estimate, but does not represent the actual retail price that 
would be arrived at in a competitive auto market. 
If efficiency improvements provided by these technologies are directed towards 
reducing the rate of fuel consumption, vehicles will provide benefits by using less fuel 
and emitting less GHG emissions over a given amount of travel. The relative fuel 
consumption of individual vehicle types is shown in Table 20.  
                                                 
51
 The production cost estimates are based on earlier work done by Kromer & Heywood (2007, pp. 117-
118) and Kasseris & Heywood (2007). This work extends their assessments by updating the estimate of 
future improvements to a conventional gasoline spark-ignition engine, and by expanding the cost estimates 
to include current cars and light trucks as well as future light trucks. 
52
 The retail price factor of 1.4 is was taken from Vyas et al. (2000) based on the assumption that 
production costs include vehicle manufacturing, and corporate and production overhead.  
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Table 19: Incremental retail price increase of current and future propulsion technologies 
VEHICLE TYPE 
CARS LIGHT TRUCKS 
Relative to 
current 
gasoline ICE 
Relative to 
2035 gasoline 
ICE 
Relative to 
current 
gasoline ICE 
Relative to 
2035 gasoline 
ICE 
Current Gasoline $0 -- $0 -- 
Current Diesel $1,700 -- $2,100 -- 
Current Turbo Gasoline $700 -- $800 -- 
Current Hybrid $4,900 -- $6,300 -- 
2035  Gasoline $2,000 $0 $2,400 $0 
2035 Diesel $3,700 $1,700 $4,500 $2,100 
2035 Turbo Gasoline $2,700 $700 $3,200 $800 
2035 Hybrid $4,500 $2,500 $5,600 $3,200 
2035 Plug-in Hybrid -- $5,900 -- $8,300 
2035 Battery Electric -- $14,400 -- $22,100 
2035 Fuel Cell -- $5,300 -- $7,400 
 
 
Table 20: Fuel consumption of current and future vehicle powertrains. Bandivadekar, 2008, p. 75. 
VEHICLE TYPE 
CARS LIGHT TRUCKS 
Fuel 
consumption 
[L / 100 km] 
Relative 
to current 
gasoline 
vehicle 
Relative to 
2035 
gasoline 
vehicle 
Fuel 
consumption 
[L / 100 km] 
Relative 
to current 
gasoline 
vehicle 
Relative to 
2035 
gasoline 
vehicle 
Current Gasoline 8.8 1.00 -- 13.6 1.00 -- 
Current Diesel 7.4 0.84 -- 10.1 0.74 -- 
Current Turbo 7.9 0.90 -- 11.3 0.83 -- 
Current Hybrid 6.2 0.70 -- 9.5 0.70 -- 
2035 Gasoline 5.5 0.63 1.00 8.6 0.63 1.00 
2035 Diesel 4.7 0.53 0.85 6.8 0.50 0.79 
2035 Turbo 4.9 0.56 0.89 7.3 0.54 0.85 
2035 Hybrid 3.1 0.35 0.56 4.8 0.35 0.56 
2035 Plug-in53 1.5 0.18 0.28 2.4 0.18 0.28 
 
                                                 
53
 0.65 L / 100 km in gasoline equivalent terms of electricity use in addition to liquid fuel consumption not 
shown for cars; 1.01 L / 100 km for light trucks 
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Table 23 and Table 24 provide a summary of the savings in fuel use and GHG 
emissions of each vehicle type over an assumed 15-year lifetime of 240,000 km vehicle 
travel. It is important to note that a negative “net price” in Table 23 and Table 24 does 
not imply that a technology is “zero cost”. Instead of lowering fuel consumption, 
efficiency improvements can also be used to increase the size and power of vehicles. The 
full cost of reducing fuel consumption would account for how changes in vehicle 
attributes such as fuel consumption, power, and size affect the value that consumers 
derive from these products (CBO, 2003; Box 2-1, p. 8). 
The results from the future vehicle cost assessment show that alternative 
powertrains entering the fleet today, such as improved gasoline and diesel engines, 
turbocharged gasoline engines and hybrid powertrains, cost from 10 to 30% more than a 
baseline gasoline vehicle. This price increase is estimated to drop to 5 to 15% in the 
future. Longer-term options such as plug-in hybrid and fuel-cell vehicles are estimated to 
cost between 25 to 30% more than a future gasoline vehicle. Battery electric vehicles 
remain costly, approaching double the cost of a future gasoline vehicle. 
Retail price increases from technologies that reduce fuel consumption are largely 
offset by fuel savings provided over the vehicle lifecycle, but not in all cases. Relative to 
a current vehicle, turbocharged gasoline engines fully pay-back the retail price increase in 
fuel savings, assuming a fuel price of $2.50 per gallon and a 5% discount rate over 15 
years of vehicle operation. Hybrid and diesel powertrains pay-back 60 and 90% of the 
up-front retail price increase respectively. Reductions in the price of future hybrid 
systems will allow these vehicles to break even, while diesel engines may loose ground 
relative to future gasoline vehicles. Longer-term options such as plug-in hybrid and fuel 
cell vehicles are estimated to pay-back 50 to 70% of the increase in retail price at $2.50 
per gallon. At higher fuel prices of $4.00 to $6.25 per gallon—equivalent to the Fuel Tax 
policy cases used in the previous section—all technologies fully pay-back the initial retail 
price increase, except diesel cars below prices of $5.25 per gallon, and the battery electric 
vehicle. 
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Table 21: Incremental production cost and vehicle weight reduction cost assumptions by powertrain type for cars. All costs in $US 2007.54 
CARS Current Current Current Current 2035 2035 2035 2035 2035 2035 2035 
 Gasoline Diesel Turbo 
Gasoline 
Hybrid Gasoline Diesel Turbo 
Gasoline 
Hybrid Plug-in 
Hybrid 
Battery 
Electric 
Fuel Cell 
Engine            
NA SI $3,000 -- $3,000 $3,000 $3,700 -- $3,700 $3,700 $3,700 -- -- 
Diesel -- $3,700 -- -- -- $4,400 -- -- -- -- -- 
Turbo -- -- $500 -- -- -- $500 -- -- -- -- 
Motor / 
controller55 -- -- -- $1000 -- -- -- $600 $800 $1,500 $1,600 
Fuel cell -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- $3,00056 
Downsizing  -- -- -- -$100 -- -- -- -$100 -$200 -- -- 
Transmission            
Hybrid trans. 
& integration -- -- -- $400 -- -- -- $300 $300 -- -- 
1-spd. trans. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- $200 $200 
Energy storage            
Battery57 -- -- -- $2,000 -- -- -- $800 $2,700 $12,000 $1,000 
H2 Storage58 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- $1,80056 
Miscellaneous            
Exhaust $300 $80059 $300 $300 $300 $80059 $300 $300 $300 -- -- 
Wiring -- -- -- $200 -- -- -- $200 $200 $200 $200 
Charger -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- $400 $400 -- 
Vehicle weight 
reduction60 -- -- -- -- $700 $700 $700 $700 $700 $700 $700 
TOTAL61 $3,300 $4,500 $3,800 $6,800 $4,700 $5,900 $5,200 $6,500 $8,900 $15,000 $8,500 
 
                                                 
54
 Production cost assumptions in this table adapted from Kromer (2007,Tables 51-53, pp. 117, 118) based on sources noted by Kromer in Table 51, p. 117. 
55
 $200 + $30 per kW for current hybrid vehicle; $200 + $15 per kW for 2035 vehicles (Kromer, 2007, Table 51, p, 117). 
56
 Assumes fuel cell costs $50 per kW; hydrogen storage costs $15 / kWh (Kromer, 2007, Table 51, p, 117). 
57
 Assumes $2000 / kWh for current hybrid vehicle. For 2035 vehicles, assumptions range from $250 / kWh for high energy batteries to $750 / kWh for high power batteries. Assumes 2035 hybrid 
battery costs $750 / kWh, 2035 plug-in hybrid battery costs $320 / kWh, 2035 fuel cell battery costs $750, 2035 battery electric vehicle costs $250 / kWh (Kromer, 2007, Table 52, p. 117). 
58
 Assumes $15 / kWh storage (Kromer, 2007, Table 51, p. 117). 
59
 Includes NOx after-treatment and diesel particulate filter (DPF). 
60
 Assumes 20% weight reduction in 2035 vehicles; roughly 14% of weight reduction is achieved through material substitution at $3 / kg; the remainder is secondary reduction at no cost. 
61
 Total incremental production cost relative to a baseline vehicle cost of $10,700. Total production cost of current gasoline car is therefore: $10,700 + $3,300 = $14,000. 
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Table 22: Incremental production cost and vehicle weight reduction cost assumptions by powertrain type for trucks. All costs in $US 2007. 
TRUCKS Current Current Current Current 2035 2035 2035 2035 2035 2035 2035 
 Gasoline Diesel Turbo 
Gasoline 
Hybrid Gasoline Diesel Turbo 
Gasoline 
Hybrid Plug-in 
Hybrid 
Battery 
Electric 
Fuel Cell 
Engine            
NA SI62 $3,900 -- $3,900 $3,900 $4,700 -- $4,700 $4,700 $4,700 -- -- 
Diesel62 -- $4,800 -- -- -- $5,600 -- -- -- -- -- 
Turbo62 -- -- $600 -- -- -- $600 -- -- -- -- 
Motor / 
controller63 -- -- -- $1,200 -- -- -- $800 $1,100 $1,900 $2,000 
Fuel cell -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- $3,90064 
Downsizing  -- -- -- -$100 -- -- -- -$100 -$200 -- -- 
Transmission            
Hybrid trans. 
& integration -- -- -- $600 -- -- -- $400 $400 -- -- 
1-spd. trans. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- $300 $300 
Energy storage            
Battery65 -- -- -- $2,600 -- -- -- $1,00066 $4,00067 $18,00067 $1,20066 
H2 Storage -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- $2,70068 
Miscellaneous            
Exhaust $300 $90069 $300 $300 $300 $90069 $300 $300 $300 -- -- 
Wiring -- -- -- $200 -- -- -- $200 $200 $200 $200 
Charger -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- $400 $400 -- 
Vehicle weight 
reduction70 -- -- -- -- $900 $900 $900 $900 $900 $900 $900 
TOTAL71 $4,200 $5,700 $4,800 $8,700 $5,900 $7,400 $6,500 $8,200 $11,800 $21,700 $11,200 
                                                 
62
 Gasoline, diesel and turbo engine costs roughly scaled by a factor of 1.3 relative to gasoline/diesel cars, the ratio of current gasoline car to truck (1620 kg to 2,140 kg) vehicle weight (EPA, 2007). 
63
 $200 + $30 for current hybrid vehicle; $200 + $15 per kW for 2035 vehicles (Kromer, 2007, Table 51, p, 117). Motor power calculated by holding power to curb weight ratio constant relative to car of 
same powertrain type; curb weight scaled relative to car by a factor of 1.3; share of power provided by engine and motor determined by degree of hybridization. 
64
 Fuel cell power scaled relative to fuel cell car by a factor of 1.3. 
65
 Assumes $2,000 / kWh for current hybrid vehicle. For future vehicles, assumed battery costs range from $250 / kWh for high energy batteries to $750 / kWh for high power batteries. Assumes 2035 
hybrid battery costs $750 / kWh, 2035 plug-in hybrid battery costs $320 / kWh, 2035 fuel cell battery costs $750 / kWh, 2035 battery electric vehicle costs $250 / kWh (Kromer, 2007, Table 52, p. 117). 
66
 Battery energy storage sized by a factor of 1.3 relative to 2035 hybrid car using a factor of 1.3; same ratio of hybrid energy storage for trucks to cars determined by Kasseris (2006, pp. 180, 184). 
67
 Battery energy storage scaled by a factor of 1.5 relative to 2035 car of same powertrain type. This is the ratio of energy required at the wheel by hybrid truck versus cars, based on ratio of fuel 
consumptions of hybrid light truck and car from Kasseris, 2006. 
68
 Assumes $15 / kWh storage (Kromer, 2007, Table 51, p. 117). Hydrogen energy storage scaled relative to car by 1.5, ratio of energy required at the wheel by trucks versus cars; see footnote 67. 
69
 Includes NOx after-treatment and diesel particulate filter (DPF). 
70
 Assumes 20% weight reduction in 2035 vehicles; roughly 14% of weight reduction is achieved through material substitution at $3 / kg; the remainder is secondary reduction at no cost. 
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Table 23: Fuel and GHG emission savings of cars with alternative propulsion technologies relative to current and future gasoline cars. Assumes 15 years of 
vehicle operation over 240,000 km72. 
CARS RELATIVE TO CURRENT GASOLINE VEHICLE RELATIVE TO 2035 GASOLINE VEHICLE 
 Current Current Current Current 2035 2035 2035 2035 2035 2035 2035 
 
Gasoline Diesel Turbo 
Gasoline 
Hybrid Gasoline Diesel Turbo 
Gasoline 
Hybrid Plug-in 
Hybrid 
Battery 
Electric 
Fuel Cell 
Tank-to-wheel fuel consumption73 [MJ / km] 
Petroleum 0.00 -0.47 -0.31 -0.87 -1.08 -0.24 -0.20 -0.78 -1.27 -1.77 -1.77 
Electricity -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.21 0.57 -- 
Hydrogen -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.74 
Total 0.00 -0.47 -0.31 -0.87 -1.08 -0.24 -0.20 -0.78 -1.06 -1.20 -1.03 
Tank-to-wheel fuel cost74 [$] 
@ $2.50 / gallon 0 -1,539 -1,008 -2,855 -3,566 -806 -647 -2,568 -3,725 -4,556 -2,363 
@ $5.00 / gallon 0 -3,077 -2,016 -5,709 -7,131 -1,613 -1,295 -5,136 -7,917 -10,381 -8,189 
Net price [$]75            
@ $2.50 / gallon 0 161 -308 2,045 -1,566 894 53 -68 2,175 9,444 2,937 
@ $5.00 / gallon 0 -1,377 -1,316 -809 -5,131 87 -595 -2,636 -2,017 3,619 -2,889 
Well-to-wheel GHG emissions76 
Emitted [tCO2e] 0 -9 -7 -19 -24 -5 -4 -17 -18 -11 -18 
Price of abatement 
[$/tCO2e] -- 184 103 256 83 360 161 145 333 1,312 300 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
71
 Total incremental production cost relative to a baseline vehicle cost of $10,800. Total production cost of current gasoline light truck is therefore: $10,800 + $4,200 = $15,000. 
72
 Vehicle travel is taken from NHSTA (2006, Tables 7 and 8, pp. 22, 25) as the average of car and light truck weighted yearly travel miles, over the first 15 years of vehicle life. 
73
 Change in tank-to-wheel (TTW) rate of fuel consumption for each propulsion system relative to current and future gasoline vehicles. 
74
 Change in TTW fuel cost is calculated using a 7% discount rate (r), an electricity cost of $0.05 / kWh, and a hydrogen cost of $3.50 / kg (NRC, 2004). Change in fuel cost is calculated for two 
gasoline and diesel prices: $2.50 / gallon and $5.00 / gallon. 
75
 Net price equals retail price increase (see Table 19) minus TTW fuel cost. A negative result implies that the fuel savings provided by the propulsion technology are greater than its original cost. 
76
 Well-to-wheel (WTW) greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e). Includes emissions from upstream fuel production and downstream vehicle operation. 
Does not include vehicle material cycle. 
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Table 24: Fuel and GHG emission savings of trucks with alternative propulsion technologies relative to current and future gasoline trucks. Assumes 15 years of 
vehicle operation over 240,000 km77. 
TRUCKS RELATIVE TO CURRENT GASOLINE VEHICLE RELATIVE TO 2035 GASOLINE VEHICLE 
 Current Current Current Current 2035 2035 2035 2035 2035 2035 2035 
 
Gasoline Diesel Turbo 
Gasoline 
Hybrid Gasoline Diesel Turbo 
Gasoline 
Hybrid Plug-in 
Hybrid 
Battery 
Electric 
Fuel Cell 
Tank-to-wheel fuel consumption78 [MJ / km] 
Petroleum 0.00 -1.13 -0.74 -1.31 -1.61 -0.58 -0.42 -1.22 -2.00 -2.77 -2.77 
Electricity -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.32 0.89 -- 
Hydrogen -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.74 
Total 0.00 -1.13 -0.74 -1.31 -1.61 -0.58 -0.42 -1.22 -1.68 -1.88 -2.03 
Tank-to-wheel fuel cost79 [$] 
@ $2.5 / gal. 0 -3,714 -2,441 -4,330 -5,306 -1,910 -1,380 -4,032 -5,880 -7,136 -3,701 
@ $5.0 / gal. 0 -7,428 -4,881 -8,659 -10,612 -3,820 -2,759 -8,065 -12,480 -16,262 -12,827 
Net price [$]80            
@ $2.5 / gal. 0 -1,614 -1,641 1,970 -3,106 190 -580 -832 2,420 14,964 3,699 
@ $5.0 / gal. 0 -5,328 -4,081 -2,359 -8,412 -1,720 -1,959 -4,865 -4,180 5,838 -5,427 
Well-to-wheel GHG emissions81 
Emitted [tCO2e] 0 -23 -16 -29 -36 -12 -9 -27 -28 -17 -28 
Abatement  price 
[$/tCO2e] -- 89 49 217 62 177 86 118 294 1,322 268 
 
                                                 
77
 Vehicle travel is taken from NHSTA (2006, Tables 7 and 8, pp. 22, 25) as the average of car and light truck weighted yearly travel miles, over the first 15 years of vehicle life. 
78
 Change in tank-to-wheel (TTW) rate of fuel consumption for each propulsion system relative to current and future gasoline vehicles. 
79
 Change in TTW fuel cost is calculated using a 7% discount rate, an electricity cost of $0.05 / kWh, and a hydrogen cost of $3.50 / kg (NRC, 2004). Change in fuel cost is calculated for two gasoline 
and diesel prices: $2.50 / gallon and $5.00 / gallon. 
80
 Net price equals retail price increase (see Table 19) plus TTW fuel cost. A negative result implies that the fuel savings provided by the propulsion technology are greater than its original cost. 
81
 Well-to-wheel (WTW) greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e). Includes emissions from upstream fuel production and vehicle operation. Does not include 
vehicle material cycle. 
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5.2.2 Integrated fleet cost scenarios 
By combining the vehicle cost estimates in Section 5.2.1 with rates at which these 
different technologies are likely to penetrate into the vehicle fleet, integrated cost 
estimates can be developed for new light-duty vehicles that enter the market in a given 
year. Bandivadekar (2008, pp. 108-109) developed three scenarios for market penetration 
of advanced propulsion systems including turbocharged gasoline engines, diesel engines, 
hybrids, and plug-in hybrids: 
The market mix scenario represents a muddling through into 
the future as no particular propulsion system dominates the 
light-duty vehicle market over the next three decades. The 
turbocharged ICE future represents a continuing dominance of 
internal combustion engines, but with an increasing emphasis 
on turbocharged gasoline engines as well as advanced 
diesels. The hybrid strong scenario presents the possibility 
that gasoline hybrids and plug-in hybrids emerge as the 
dominant powertrain combinations. 
Assuming vehicles maintain constant size and performance relative to today82, the 
improvement in new vehicle fuel consumption under the Hybrid Strong scenario is 
similar to the CAFE High policy case developed in Section 5.1.1. The Market Mix and 
Turbocharged ICE Future realize less aggressive reductions in new vehicle fuel 
consumption between 2010 and 2035. Of the three scenarios, Hybrid Strong therefore 
provides a representative case of aggressive technology penetration that approaches the 
stringency of the CAFE High policy case. 
The shares of powertrain technologies that enter the light-duty fleet under the 
Hybrid Strong scenario (shown in Figure 18) can be combined with the future vehicle 
cost estimates to determine the extra costs of reducing fuel use and GHG emissions 
relative to No Change in fuel consumption from today. Integrated costs and retail price 
increases across the light-duty fleet for the 2020 and 2035 model years are developed in 
Table 25. The reductions in fuel use and GHG results assume a constant fuel price of 
$2.50 per gallon and account for the rebound effect using the same vehicle travel 
elasticity assumptions as in Section 5.1.1. 
 
                                                 
82
 This is equivalent to a 100% “emphasis on reducing fuel consumption” (ERFC), using the terminology 
developed in Bandivadekar (2008, pp. 70-71). 
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Figure 18: Market shares of advanced powertrain technologies under Hybrid Strong scenario. Italics 
represent market share in 2035.(Bandivadekar, 2008, p. 115). 
The results show that the production cost of improvements that reduce fuel 
consumption is $20 billion in 2020, growing to $70 billion by 2035. This is roughly an 
additional 8% of the baseline production cost in 2020 if fuel consumption remained 
constant from today, and 21% of the baseline cost in 2035. In terms of retail price, the 
average vehicle is roughly $1,600 more expensive in 2020, and $4,500 more in 2035. 
Under the Hybrid Heavy penetration scenario, production costs would increase by 
8% in 2020 relative to the baseline cost if fuel consumption remained constant from 
today; this share would grow to 21% of the baseline cost by 2035. The payback period in 
either model year relative to the No Change baseline is 4 years using a discount rate of 
5% and a constant fuel price of $2.50 per gallon; at $4.00 per gallon this period drops to 2 
years. 
Without accounting for the value of fuel savings, the cost of reducing a ton of 
GHG emissions in either model year is roughly $75 per metric ton of CO2 equivalent 
($275 per ton of carbon). For comparison, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change estimates that GHG reductions costing between of $20 to $80 per ton of CO2e 
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($70 to $300 per ton of carbon) before 2030, and between $30 to $150 ($110 to $550 per 
ton of carbon) by 2050, will be required in order to stabilize atmospheric GHG emissions 
at 550 ppm CO2-equivalent by 2100 (IPCC, 2007; Working Group III, SPM, p. 19). 
Table 25: Cost and benefits of hybrid strong scenario for 2020 and 2035 model years, relative to No 
Change in new light-duty vehicle fuel consumption. All prices are in $2007. 
Model Year 2020 2035 
Total extra production cost [$ billion] 20 70 
Percentage of baseline production cost [%] 8% 21% 
Increase in retail price of avg. 
vehicle [$ / vehicle] 
Cars 1,430 4,000 
L-T 1,700 4,900 
Retail price increase in cents 
per km83 (r = 7%) [¢ / km] 
Cars 0.9 2.6 
L-T 1.0 3.0 
Fuel savings [billions L] 130 440 
GHG emission savings [MtCO2e] 350 1,300 
Payback period 
(r = 7%) [years] 
$2.50 / gal. 4 
$4.00 / gal. 2 
Price of GHG reduction [$ / ton CO2e] 
(does not include fuel savings) 75 
Price of FC benefit [$ per L / 100 km] 
(does not include fuel savings)  700 
L-T = Light truck 
The increase in price of reducing fuel consumption by one liter per 100 kilometers 
in either model year is approximately $700 relative to the No Change baseline. Under a 
feebate system, Section 4.3 concluded that rates on the order of $225 to $500 per L / 100 
km have been implemented in various countries around the world. This range would 
offset one-third to two-thirds of the average vehicle retail price increase under the Hybrid 
Heavy scenario. For cost-effective technologies, such as conventional improvements in 
gasoline engines and turbocharging, the feebate incentive would entirely neutralize the 
retail price increase. Other, more expensive options such as diesel and hybrid engines 
would have their retail price increase reduced by one-half and a third respectively. 
 
 
                                                 
83
 Assumes a 15 year lifetime for cars and light trucks. Vehicle travel is representative of today’s cars and 
light trucks, and was taken from (NHTSA, 2006b); likely gives a conservative estimate of extra retail price 
per kilometer since travel per vehicle is expected to increase from today until 2020 and 2035. 
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5.3 Sensitivity analysis 
The fuel tax policy cases are especially sensitive to the elasticities assumed with 
respect to fuel price and the fuel cost of travel. It is important to verify that conclusions 
drawn from the behavior of the fuel tax policies are robust across a range of elasticity 
values. This section uses a range of values used to test the sensitivity of the fuel price 
cases. The variation in parameters is shown in Table 26. 
Table 26: Range of fuel use and vehicle travel elasticities used to test the sensitivity of the fuel tax policy 
cases 
  ELASTICITY VALUES 
  Short term Long term 
Change in vehicle travel 
with respect to a change 
in fuel cost of travel 
Less responsive -0.02 -0.05 
Assumed value -0.03 -0.10 
More responsive -0.05 -0.20 
Change in new vehicle 
fuel consumption with 
respect to a change in 
fuel price 
Less responsive -0.02 -0.17 
Assumed value -0.03 -0.33 
More responsive -0.05 -0.50 
 
The results in Table 27 show that the fuel tax policy cases are sensitive to the 
elasticity inputs, particularly the rates of new vehicle fuel consumption. Note that the 
variation in vehicle travel under the Fuel Tax case remains relatively constant between 
2020 to 2035; this is due to the fact that the fuel tax does not increase after 2020 while 
vehicle fuel consumption continues to improve slightly, causing the vehicle travel to 
rebound. It is also important to note that the reductions in fuel use and GHG emissions 
are not the same because the GHG emissions include emissions generated from 
producing the materials embodied within new vehicles; these emissions increase over 
time, as new technologies and lightweight materials are implemented in future vehicles to 
reduce fuel consumption84. 
Small variations in the assumed elasticities result in large changes in the estimates 
of future fuel use and GHG emissions from light-duty vehicles. For the Fuel Tax case, the 
reductions in fuel use and GHG emissions range from 7 to 20% across the variation in the 
                                                 
84
 The material cycle includes material extraction and processing steps, but does not include transportation 
of materials nor manufacturing or assembly of vehicles. See Section 3.1 for details on the material lifecycle 
assumptions used in the fleet model. 
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elasticity assumptions. This sensitivity is even greater under the Fuel Tax High case, 
where the reductions from No Change vary from 11 to 30%. At the same time, the results 
of this study are intended to quantitatively illustrate the effects and interaction of fuel tax 
increases alongside CAFE—they are not meant to forecast the future fuel use and GHG 
emissions from light-duty U.S. vehicles. 
Table 27: Sensitivity of changes in elasticity values. Reductions in new vehicle fuel consumption, light-duty 
fleet vehicle travel, light-duty fuel use and GHG emissions relative to No Change are shown for the Fuel 
Tax and Fuel Tax High Policy cases. 
RELATIVE TO 
NO CHANGE 
Avg. on-road new 
vehicle fuel 
consumption 
[L / 100 km] 
Vehicle travel 
[trillion km] 
Fuel use 
[billion liters] 
GHG emissions85 
[MtCO2e] 
2020 2035 2020 2035 2020 2035 2020 2035 
Fuel Tax Case         
Less responsive -3% -8% -2% -2% -3% -8% -3% -7% 
Assumed value -7% -14% -4% -4% -7% -14% -6% -13% 
More responsive -10% -21% -8% -6% -12% -21% -11% -19% 
Fuel Tax High Case         
Less responsive -3% -14% -2% -4% -3% -13% -3% -11% 
Assumed value -7% -26% -4% -7% -7% -23% -6% -21% 
More responsive -10% -37% -8% -12% -12% -33% -11% -30% 
 
For these purposes, the behavior of the fuel tax policy measures is consistent. The 
magnitude of the impact that a fuel tax policy might have on fuel use and GHG emissions 
is highly sensitive to the assumed elasticities values, however. As a result, it is not 
possible to accurately determine the extent to which a fuel tax would reduce fuel use and 
GHG emissions. The results of the sensitivity analysis suggest reductions on the order of 
7 to 30% below the No Change baseline, given the fuel tax policies implemented. 
A second assumption that the fuel tax policy cases are sensitive to is the starting 
price of fuel. The assumed price of $2.50 per gallon in 2010 was drawn from the EIA’s 
Annual Energy Outlook 2008. Recent trends in world oil prices, however, have shown 
that fuel prices are subject to considerable uncertainty even in the short- to near-term. As 
a result, two different starting price cases were evaluated. First, a higher starting fuel 
price of $4.00 per gallon was chosen to reflect current trends in elevated fuel prices. 
                                                 
85
 Includes well-to-tank, tank-to-wheel, and material cycle GHG emissions. 
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Second, a lower starting price of $1.70 per gallon was evaluated. This value was chosen 
as the average fuel price between 1988 and 2002—a period of relative stability in world 
oil prices. In this way, the higher starting price captures recent trends towards higher 
prices, while the lower price evaluates changes in the light duty fleet relative to what has 
been a stable price equilibrium for over a decade. 
Table 28: Sensitivity to changes in starting fuel price. Reductions in new vehicle fuel consumption, light-
duty fleet vehicle travel, light-duty fuel use and GHG emissions relative to No Change are shown for the 
Fuel Tax and Fuel Tax High Policy cases. 
RELATIVE TO 
$2.50 / gallon 
STARTING FUEL 
PRICE 
Avg. on-road new 
vehicle fuel 
consumption 
[L / 100 km] 
Vehicle travel 
[trillion km] 
Fuel use 
[billion liters] 
GHG Emissions 
[MtCO2e] 
2020 2035 2020 2035 2020 2035 2020 2035 
Fuel Tax High Case         
$1.50 / gallon -9% -32% -6% -9% -9% -28% -8% -25% 
$2.50 / gallon -7% -26% -4% -7% -7% -23% -6% -21% 
$4.00 / gallon -5% -20% -3% -5% -5% -17% -4% -15% 
 
The results are shown in Table 28. The Fuel Tax High policy case was evaluated 
for starting fuel prices of $1.70 and $4.00 per gallon by adding $0.15 per gallon annually 
to each starting price until 2035. The sensitivity results show that the variations in new 
vehicle fuel consumption, fuel use, and GHG emissions are on the order of +/- 10% by 
2035. Under a higher starting fuel price of $4.00 per gallon, the light-duty fleet is less 
responsive to fuel tax increases. Since fuel prices are already high, the annual $0.15 per 
gallon fuel tax increases are smaller in percentage terms, and therefore stimulate less of a 
response in reduced fuel consumption and vehicle travel. Under a lower starting fuel 
price of $1.50 per gallon, the light-duty fleet is more responsive to changes in fuel price. 
As a result, the annual $0.15 per gallon tax increases stimulate greater reductions in new 
vehicle fuel consumption and vehicle travel. 
5.4 Summary and discussion 
This chapter has illustrated how fuel tax and feebate policies could play a role 
alongside CAFE as a means of reducing fuel use and GHG emissions in light-duty 
vehicles. In particular, the following insights are offered: 
 97
• Continuous and long-term improvements in fuel consumption, ideally 
accompanied by reduced rates of growth in vehicle travel, are necessary to 
maintain a downward trajectory in fuel use and GHG emissions in the light-
duty fleet. Without sustained effort, growth in vehicle sales and travel can 
reverse short-term reductions in consumption and emission rates. 
• If feasible, the improvements mandated by the new CAFE legislation will 
enable dramatic reductions in new vehicle fuel consumption over a relatively 
short timeframe (10 years). Increasing the cost of travel reduces fuel 
consumption gradually over a much longer timeframe (15 to 20 years).  
• Based on the assumed fuel prices and response in travel with respect to per-
kilometer costs, the overall rebound effect under CAFE is smaller compared to 
the improvement in fleet fuel consumption, as it only affects new vehicles 
entering the fleet. Fuel taxes have a larger impact on reducing vehicle travel 
since they impact the entire in-use fleet. This effect is greater on older vehicles 
with higher rates of fuel consumption; as lower-income groups typically own 
older vehicles, policy makers will have to address this potentially regressive 
impact, perhaps through equitable tax revenue distribution. 
• An important effect of coordinating CAFE with policies that increase the fuel 
cost of travel is the alignment of consumer demand with regulatory 
requirements for reduced fuel consumption. Policies that influence consumer 
behavior can pull reductions in fuel consumption into the market, although at a 
more gradual rate than required by the push of current regulatory fuel 
consumption standards in the United States. Under the policy cases evaluated, 
consumer demand was found to contribute to a quarter of the fuel consumption 
reductions required under CAFE by 2020, increasing to half by 2035. 
• Fuel tax increases shift some of the costs onto consumers. Relative to No 
Change, the fuel tax policies evaluated here would increase the fuel cost of 
travel by 43% in 2020 under a 15-cent annual increase per gallon until 2020, 
declining to 22% above No Change by 2035. If the fuel tax increases were 
sustained beyond 2020, the fuel cost of travel would continue to increase by 
64% relative to the No Change case in 2035. 
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• Turbocharged gasoline engines, diesel engines, and hybrids entering the fleet 
today are estimated to cost from 5 to 30% more than a baseline gasoline 
vehicle. Longer-term options such as plug-in hybrids and fuel cell vehicles 
would cost 25 to 35% more than a future gasoline vehicle. Battery electric 
vehicles are even more costly. 
• The retail price increases of technologies that reduce fuel consumption are 
largely offset by fuel savings provided over the vehicle lifecycle at prices of 
$2.50 per gallon, but not in all cases. At higher fuel prices of $6.00 per gallon, 
all technologies, except the battery-electric vehicle, fully pay-back the initial 
retail price increase in fuel savings. Consumers may pay from $1,500 to $4,500 
more for vehicles with dramatically lower rates of fuel consumption, but 
similar size and performance as today. 
• Under technology penetration scenarios approaching the stringency of 
Congress’ legislated CAFE target, the average price of GHG reduction is on 
the order of $75 / metric ton of CO2e. This is in the range of IPCC carbon price 
forecasts necessary for stabilization of atmospheric CO2 concentrations at 550 
ppm by 2100. 
• Feebate incentives on the order of $225 to $500 per L / 100 km can offset one- 
to two-thirds of the average vehicle retail price increase under aggressive 
advanced technology penetration scenarios. The exact level of the incentive 
will vary across different vehicle powertrains. Alongside CAFE, these 
incentives help subsidize the penetration of new technologies into the fleet. 
• The impact that fuel tax increases may have on fuel consumption, vehicle 
travel, and overall fuel use and GHG emissions is uncertain and highly 
sensitive to assumptions of price elasticities and starting fuel prices. With low 
elasticity assumptions, the reductions under aggressive fuel tax policies are 
very modest—on the order of 7 to 13%. Under higher elasticity assumptions, 
reductions in fuel use and GHG emissions may be as large as 20 to 33% under 
an aggressive fuel tax policy. 
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6.0 Conclusion 
All the while at the South Elgin Marathon, the tanker trucks come 
and go, disgorging their liquid tales into the ground. [...] As usual, the 
fuel’s stories went unheard. They were expelled from countless tailpipes. 
 
 - Paul Salopek, A tank of gas, a world of trouble 
 
This report has attempted to address the challenging question of how policies can 
achieve dramatic reductions in fuel use and greenhouse gas emissions from light-duty 
vehicles in the United States. In its review of policy options, this report considered 
vehicle standards (or fuel consumption standards), vehicle tax systems and feebates, fuel 
and carbon taxes, pay as you drive arrangements, and scrappage incentives. It concluded 
that fiscal policies, coordinated alongside CAFE, can achieve reductions more effectively 
by acting on key stakeholders in the system, through behavioral as well as technological 
changes, and by impacting multiple stages of vehicle purchase, operation, and retirement. 
The report found that fiscal options may align the interests of manufacturers and 
consumers to overcome resistance in ways that do not require perverse incentives that 
reduce the overall effectiveness of policies. 
By developing illustrative policy scenarios, this report has demonstrated the role 
that fuel tax increases might play in collaboration with CAFE fuel consumptions 
standards. It noted two important effects: that fuel taxes align consumer demand for 
lower rates of fuel consumption with regulatory requirements placed on manufacturers, 
and that fuel taxes achieve reductions alongside CAFE standards by promoting 
alternatives to private transport and reducing vehicle travel. 
Finally, with engineering cost estimates of future technology options, the report 
addressed the costs and benefits of reducing vehicle fuel consumption. It found that the 
costs were on the order of an additional 8 to 20% of baseline costs if there was no change 
in fuel consumption from today. It estimated that consumers could expect to pay between 
$1,500 to $4,500 more on average for vehicles with dramatically lower fuel consumption, 
but roughly the same size and performance as today. The report also found that these 
significant costs were largely offset by the benefits of fuel savings, and that the costs (not 
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including fuel savings) of reducing greenhouse gas emissions were within estimates of 
the global prices necessary to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide at 
what are considered safe levels. 
At the same time, this report leaves many questions unaddressed. It focused on 
the role that fuel taxes could play alongside CAFE, but other fiscal arrangements may be 
better suited towards achieving reductions in fuel consumption over the long term. While 
this report suggested economic, equity, and political grounds for increases in the fuel tax, 
barriers will likely persist in achieving significant and sustained increases over the near-
term. Another question is how the revenue from fiscal options could be spent; whether to 
counter regressive impacts on low-income households, finance highway infrastructure 
investment, or perhaps even speed research and development of more efficient 
automotive technologies. 
It is likely that in the next few years, the United States will enact climate 
legislation that may require reductions of up to 80% of greenhouse gas emissions from 
current levels across all sectors of the economy. In the face of these stringent reduction 
targets, it is critical to better understand the magnitude of reductions from transportation 
that have the best chance of yielding the highest net societal benefits, and what the price 
tag will be. Further study will be necessary to determine the role that transportation—and 
light-duty vehicles in particular—can play out to 2050 and beyond in achieving GHG 
reductions efficiently and in a cost-effective manner. 
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